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Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions
to Regulate Artificial Intelligence
Michael Guihot,* Anne F. Matthew** & Nicolas P. Suzor***
ABSTRACT

There is a pervading sense of unease that artificially intelligent
machines will soon radically alter our lives in ways that are still
unknown.
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) technology are
developing at an extremely rapid rate as computational power
continues to grow exponentially. Even if existential concerns about AI
do not materialize, there are enough concrete examples of problems
associated with current applicationsof AI to warrant concern about the
level of control that exists over developments in this field. Some form of
regulation is likely necessary to protect society from harm. However,
advances in regulatory capacity have not kept pace with developments
in new technologies, including AL. This is partly because regulation
has become decentered; that is, the traditionalrole of public regulators
such as governments commanding regulation has dissipated, and other
participants including those from within the industry have taken the
lead. Other contributing factors are dwindling government resources
on one hand and the increased power of technology companies on the
other. These factors have left the field of AI development relatively
unregulated. Whatever the reason, it is now more difficult for
traditionalpublic regulatory bodies to control the development of Al.
In the vacuum, industry participants have begun to self-regulate by
promoting soft law options such as codes of practice and standards.
This Article argues that despite the reduced authority of public
regulatory agencies, the risks associated with runaway AI require
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regulators to begin to participate in what is largely an unregulated
field. In an environment where resources are scarce, governments or
public regulators must develop new ways of regulating. This Article
proposes solutions to regulating the development of AI ex ante through
a two-step process: first, governments can set expectations and send
signals to influence participants in AI development. The Authors
adopt the term "nudging" to refer to this type of influencing. Second,
public regulators must participate in and interact with the relevant
industries. By doing this, they can gather information and knowledge
about the industries, begin to assess risks, and then be in a position to
regulate those areas that pose the most risk first. To conduct a proper
risk analysis, regulators must have sufficient knowledge and
understanding about the target of regulation to be able to classify
The Authors have proposed an initial
various risk categories.
that can help to direct pressing
on
the
literature
classification based
issues for further research and a deeper understanding of the various
applicationsof AI and the relative risks they pose.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Google purchased DeepMind in 2014, its owners made it
a condition of the sale that Google establish an ethics board to govern
the future use of the artificial intelligence (A) technology.' This
insistence betrayed concerns about Al development from within the
industry. Google apparently agreed to set up the ethics board, but
nothing is known about the identity of the board members or the
content of their discussions. On July 20, 2016, Google reported that it
had deployed DeepMind's machine learning in a series of tests on one
of its live data centers. 2 The tests resulted in a reported 40 percent
decrease in energy consumption for the center while the Al was
applied. 3 DeepMind reported that

1.
Alex Hern, Whatever Happened to the DeepMind Al Ethics Board Google Promised?,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 2017, 9:50 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/26/googledeepmind-ai-ethics-board [https://perma.c/XZ7H-XM3A].
2.
Richard Evans & Jim Gao, DeepMind AI Reduces Google Data Centre Cooling Bill by
40%, DEEPMIND (July 20, 2016), https://deepmind.com/blog/deepmind-ai-reduces-google-datacentre-cooling-bill-40/ [https://perma.cclE8N9-3VTF].
3.
Id.
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[w]orking at Google scale gives us the opportunity to learn how to apply our
research to truly global and complex problems, to validate the impact we can have
on systems that have already been highly optimised by brilliant computer
scientists, and-as our data centre work shows-to achieve amazing real-world
impact too.4

Working at "Google scale" presumably means using Google's
worldwide infrastructure to test its AI systems-the opportunities for
which appear to be limitless. Google has already expanded its testing
using DeepMind in other areas such as to reduce global warming5 and
to improve diagnosis and treatment in healthcare. 6
If the results of the application of Al in Google's data centers
can be replicated more broadly so as to reduce the world's energy
consumption, avert global warming, or enable affordable, accessible
healthcare, then humanity will reap great benefits.' However, while
the results of the tests appear laudable, some questions linger-for
instance, what checks and balances were in place to govern the
application of Al here? Were any risks of its application considered
and ameliorated in the tests? What governance is in place to control
companies testing beta versions of Al applications on a large scale?
Conversely, if regulation is put in place prematurely or without proper
thought and consultation, would the potential benefits that might
result from the general application of these programs in other areas be
retarded or lost? In short, would regulation have a chilling effect on
innovation that is harmful for the long-term public interest? The
Authors argue that, with these questions in mind, AI should be more
actively regulated because the benefits that can be achieved through
controlled or regulated application outweigh the potential negative
impacts of regulating. This Article addresses these and some of the
many other issues that must be addressed by potential regulators
when seeking to regulate new technologies such as Al.
Part II outlines the range of threats posed by different
applications of Al and introduces the case for regulating its

4.
DeepMind Collaborations with Google, DEEPMIND, https://deepmind.com/applied/
deepmind-for-google/ [https://perma.cc/6EWK-8ZW9] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
5.
Sam Shead, DeepMind Is Funding Climate Change Research at Cambridge as It
Looks to Use Al to Slow Down Global Warming, Bus. INSIDER (June 21, 2017, 7:41 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/deepmind-is-funding-climate-change-research-at-cambridgeuniversity-2017-6.
6.
See Mustafa Suleyman, Working with the NHS to Build Lifesaving Technology,
DEEPMIND (Nov. 22, 2016), https://deepmind.com/blog/working-nhs-build-lifesaving-technology/
[https://perma.cc/E9H2-SQCM].
7.
See DeepMind Collaborations with Google, supra note 4. Here, this Article has
concentrated on the work of Google, but it is only one of the major innovators in this area.
Similar work on developing Al is also being carried out by Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple, to
name a few. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
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development.
While some argue that developing Al poses an
existential threat to humanity, others point to the benefits attained by
relatively controlled development and application of more benign
systems.
The Authors contend that these arguments are at
cross-purposes and distract from a more pressing need: government
ought to not only play a part in guiding the development of AI for the
broader benefit of humankind but also must regulate to address the
very real and present problems associated with current applications of
Al today. These include bias and safety concerns, the pressing effect
on employment, and the inherent intrusion into our privacy caused by
AI interrogating the data society generates in everyday life. Before
society contemplates regulating Al, however, it is necessary to more
precisely define and classify the different technologies that are often
referred to as Al. This classification exercise, the Authors argue, is
vital to understanding the different types of risks that regulation
might seek to address. This spectrum of risks posed by different
classes of Al provides the basis upon which the Authors ultimately
argue for a stratified approach to regulation.
This is developed
further in Part V.
Part III sets out the challenges of regulating AI. The pace of
innovation in Al has far outstripped the pace of innovation in
regulatory tools that might be used to govern it. This is often referred
to as the pacing problem of regulation." In these situations, regulation
lags behind or in some circumstances "decouples" from the technology
it seeks to address. 9 Another core challenge regulatory agencies face
lies in the difficulty in understanding the social impacts of Al on a
systems level and engaging with these impacts at every (or any) stage
of development.10 A "social-systems analysis" will allow regulators to
understand the operation of Al in a broad social context." As the
DeepMind example illustrates, the reasons for particular decisions
involving the ways in which Al is developed and applied can be

8.
See Kenneth W. Abbott, Introduction: The Challenges of Oversight for Emerging
Technologies, in INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 1, 3 (Gary E.
Marchant et al. eds., 2014); Braden R. Allenby, Governance and Technology Systems: The
Challenge of Emerging Technologies, in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM 3, 16-17 (Gary E. Marchant et al. eds.,
2011).
Braden R. Allenby, The Dynamics of Emerging Technology Systems, in INNOVATIVE
9.
GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 8, at 19, 43.
10.
Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, Comment, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, 538
313 (2016), https://www.nature.com/polopolyfs/1.20805!/menulmain/
NATURE 311, 311,
topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/538311a.pdf [https://perma.cclG2TL-NK9V].
11.
See id. at 313.
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even
and
sometimes
largely
incomprehensible, 12
opaque,
13
Research and development in AI is carried out in many
unknowable.
different locations, at different times, and in ways that are not highly
visible. The scale of research also varies and can be carried out by a
single person on a home computer or at a scale that only large
multinational companies such as Google can attain.
There is no shortage of advice given to regulators about how to
respond to technological change. The Authors review the challenges
that current and future developments in Al are likely to pose for
regulators and the different and sometimes conflicting advice that
commentators have urged regulators to follow. The Authors consider
the urgency of developing effective mechanisms of regulation and
explain how the challenges of regulating Al are different in kind to the
challenges of regulating in other domains. The Authors argue that, as
many public regulators now find themselves without the resources to
adequately understand or intervene in the range of complex issues
that rapid developments in Al present, some regulatory innovation is
required. In order to meet these challenges, the Authors suggest that
regulators will need to be adaptable, develop new strategies to learn
about risks, and identify opportunities to influence technological
developers.
The Authors show that recent developments in how
regulation is conceived go some way to identifying potential future
strategies for public regulators but that more work is needed.
Part IV considers how public regulators such as governments
face an unprecedented challenge in managing complex governance
systems that include not only public regulatory agencies but also
individuals, firms, market competitors, and civil society organizations
that all might play some role in influencing the development of Al in
different contexts.
While the regulation of other emerging
technologies is not directly applicable to AI, there is much that can be
learned from innovations in regulation of other fields. 14 Current
regulatory mechanisms, including laws governing tort, copyright,
privacy, patent, and regulations that govern other emerging
technologies, are either unsuitable or, for other reasons, cannot easily
be applied to novel technological developments in areas such as the
regulation of AI. 15 The challenge in regulating this field is magnified
12.
See Perri 6, Ethics, Regulation and the New Artificial Intelligence, Part II: Autonomy
and Liability, 4 INFO. COMM. & SOC'Y 406, 410 (2001).
13.

See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT

CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 4 (Harvard Univ. Press 2015).
14.
Roger Brownsword, So What Does the World Need Now? Reflections on Regulating
Technologies, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES:

LEGAL FUTURES,

REGULATORY FRAMES AND

TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 23, 23, 30 (Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung eds., 2008).
15.
See Allenby, supra note 9, at 20-22.
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by fundamental uncertainty about how AI will develop and how that
development may impact other challenges society will face in the
future.1 6

The size and power of the multinational companies that
develop most of the world's Al-such as Google, Facebook, and
Microsoft-raise fundamental issues about the ability of governments
to regulate in this area at all. Far fewer of the traditional tools of
regulation once available to governments seeking to regulate AI
remain viable or available. The Authors highlight the concerns being
expressed about the rampant research and development into AI by
some of the world's biggest companies, ostensibly ungoverned,1 7 and
propose some innovative solutions to counterbalance the power
disparity. The Authors review the range of proposals and suggestions
for regulating Al and consider how regulatory theory provides
guidance.
Part V argues that in the context of highly constrained
governance resources, some regulatory innovation is required. Some
regulation theorists are experimenting with different interventions in
choice architecture to set the context and environment in which
choices are made so as to promote regulatory goals.18 The Authors
argue that there is a role for government to play in shaping the
regulatory environment at a very broad policy level by nudging or
influencing beneficial development. 19 By using its influence in this
way, government can seek to guide the development of Al by framing
the agenda in positive ways without wholly relinquishing its
traditional regulatory role. This will also allow governments to
develop a fuller regulatory response over time. The multitude of
different applications of Al makes it improbable that nudging would
have an effect at the micro level of individual applications. At this
micro level, the Authors suggest that other more concrete regulatory
approaches need to be employed. For a government to influence the
16.

See Gonenc Gurkaynak,

Ilay Yilmaz & Gunes

Haksever,

Stifling Artificial

Intelligence: Human Perils, 32 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 749, 754-55 (2016).

Kate Crawford and Ryan Calo raised this issue in their comment in Nature,
17.
referring to it as the "blind spot in thinking about AI." See Crawford & Calo, supra note 10, at
311.
See, e.g., Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Behavioural Sciences and the Regulation of
18.
&

Privacy on the Internet, in NUDGE AND THE LAw: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (Alberto Alemanno

Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2014).
19.
Other versions of adaptive policymaking to address deep uncertainty have been
proposed using various models or approaches to policymaking. See, e.g., Warren E. Walker,
Vincent A.W.J. Marchau & Darren Swanson, Addressing Deep Uncertainty Using Adaptive
Policies, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 917, 918 (2010); Warren E. Walker, S. Adnan
Rahman & Jonathan Cave, Adaptive Policies, Policy Analysis, and Policy-Making, 128 EUR. J.
OPERATIONAL RES. 282, 283 (2001).

392

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:2:385

development of Al systems and successfully further the public
interest, it must be able to understand and influence this complex and
intricate web of actors that often have diverse goals, intentions,
purposes, norms, and powers. 20 When the focus shifts to regulation
within individual industries or of particular types of Al applications,
regulatory agencies must move beyond nudging and adopt more
focused, nuanced, and adaptive approaches to regulation. 21 Other
theorists have proposed greater roles for regulatory agencies with
specific expertise. 22 Still others have suggested that public regulators
may be able to experiment with more rapid, temporary laws, 23
although the potential lack of legal certainty that results may create
further problems for investors and other participants in the field. The
Authors identify some of these opportunities for innovation in the
work of public regulators.
A regulatory intervention in the development of Al technology
must consider the spectrum of risks that different Al applications
pose. Part V introduces a risk-based regulation framework to help
regulators work through the different forms of Al and to identify
The
where scarce regulatory resources should be concentrated.
Authors' initial typology presents three discrete categories: low-,
medium-, and high-risk applications of AL. Of these, the Authors
suggest that the most productive area for regulators to focus on at the
moment is medium- to high-risk categories, but that the potential for
low-risk AI to quickly develop into high risk should mean that these
areas must not be completely discounted.
Part VI concludes with a suggestion for greater cooperation and
information sharing between regulators and the potentially regulated.
The Authors argue that, with the increase in societal concerns about
the risk inherent in developing AI, regulation of Al is an inevitable
and responsible approach to governance.

See Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and
20.
Self-Regulation in a 'Post-Regulatory'World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 106-09 (2001).
See Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent
21.
Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483, 487, 576 (2008) (proposing
the application of his version of "adaptive policymaking," where regulators "tinker" with "inputs,
connectivity, incentives, and feedback" to encourage firms to act in ways that further the public
good).
22.
See, e.g., Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 354, 357 (2016).
Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for Innovation 16 (Univ. of St. Thomas (Minn.)
23.
Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 16-22, 2016); see SOFIA RANCHORDAS, CONSTITUTIONAL
SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 217 (2014).
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II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?

To be able to regulate Al, regulatory bodies must understand it
and the potential risks that it poses. The Authors must look both back
and into the future to see how Al has been defined and what it might
become and what risks Al has posed and might pose in the future.
This Part outlines some attempts that have been made to define Al
and demonstrates that there is no concrete definition. 24 This has led
to an informal classification system based upon the "strength" of the
underlying algorithm or its ultimate effect. Traditional classifications
of Al differentiate between "narrow" and "strong" AI. 2 5
This
dichotomy is an unsatisfactory way of measuring Al because it rests
on dissimilar considerations of breadth and strength. The Authors
propose a different classification based upon the risks that each Al
application poses. In this way, the Authors can begin to sort various
classes of AI based on whether the AI poses a low, medium, or high
risk to either society or to human safety or wellbeing.
This
classification is crucial to understanding how regulatory strategies can
be tailored to the relevant Al risk profile. Regulatory bodies need to
perform this risk analysis before they develop laws that affect a class
of Al. It is important, then, to distinguish the various meanings given
to the term "artificial intelligence" and the different forms Al may
take. This allows the identification of a subset or range of applications
of AI most suitable for governments or regulatory bodies to initially
regulate.
A. DefiningAI
Before defining AI, intelligence must first be defined.
Intelligence in human terms has been described as a set of factors that
include "consciousness, self-awareness, language use, the ability to
learn, the ability to abstract, the ability to adapt, and the ability to
reason." 26 Once intelligence is defined, estimations or approximations
24.
See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN
APPROACH 1-5 (3d ed. 2010).
25.

See, e.g., RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND

BIOLOGY 206, 222 (Rick Kot ed., 2005).

26.
Scherer, supra note 22, at 360. Consciousness on its own has proved notoriously
difficult to define, a difficulty amplified when attempting to define artificial consciousness. See
GERALD M. EDELMAN, THE REMEMBERED PRESENT: A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
4-5 (1990); Francis Crick & J. Clark, The Astonishing Hypothesis, 1 J. CONSCIOUS STUD. 10,

(1994);

Francis Crick
SEMINARS

& Christof Koch,
NEUROSCIENCES

263,

Towards a Neurobiological Theory of
263-75

(1990);

Stanislas

Dehaene

&

10-16

Consciousness, 2

Jean-Pierre Changeux, Experimental and Theoretical Approaches to Conscious Processing, 70

NEURON 200, 200 (2011); Christof Koch et al., Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Progress and
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of those qualities should form the benchmark of attempts to create or
simulate it-hence artificial intelligence. But for which of those
characteristics of intelligence can a simulation be called Al? Must it
replicate all aspects of intelligence?
John McCarthy, the computer scientist who originally coined
the term Al, did not limit intelligence in Al to a replication of human
intelligence but argued that machines could display other intelligences
that involve "much more computing than people can do." 2 7 He defined
Al as "the science and engineering of making intelligent machines,
especially intelligent computer programs." 28 Steven Omohundro, a
leading scientist in the field, adopted an external agency requirement
and defined Al as a system that "has goals which it tries to accomplish
by acting in the world." 29 Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, the writers
of a popular university textbook on Al, summarized eight definitions
of Al differentiated by how they reflected expectations of human
thinking and behavior, or rational (machine) thinking and behavior. 30
Ultimately, Russell and Norvig preferred the rational agent approach
in which machine agents "operate autonomously, perceive their
environment, persist over a prolonged time period, adapt to change,
and create and pursue [the best expected outcome]." 31 To be able to
display these characteristics, Al also needs to be actuated in
machinery whether that is a computer system or a robot. Typically,
though, these machine behaviors have been compared against human
abilities to process language, to reason, and to perceive and
manipulate objects in the environment to attain predetermined
goals. 32
All of these definitions set a fairly high bar for an algorithm to
attain before it meets the definition of Al. Al can therefore be
differentiated from machine learning systems, and even from machine
Problems, 17 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE

307, 307 (2016); Steve Torrance,

Ethics and

Consciousness in Artificial Agents, 22 Al & SOC'Y 495, 497-98 (2008); Paul F. M. J. Verschure,
Synthetic Consciousness: The DistributedAdaptive Control Perspective, 371 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS

ROYAL SoC'Y B, Aug. 2016, at 1-2, http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/royptb/
371/1701/20150448.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/58EQ-U3ER]; Wendell Wallach, Colin Allen & Stan
Franklin, Consciousness and Ethics: Artificially Conscious Moral Agents, 3 INT'L J. MACHINE
CONSCIOUSNESS 177, 177 (2011).

27.
John McCarthy, What Is Artificial Intelligence?, STAN. U. (Nov. 12, 2007),
http://www-formal.stanford.eduljmc/whatisailwhatisai.html [https://perma.cc/N5YZ-QYS7].
Id.
28.
29.

Stephen M. Omohundro, The Basic AI Drives, in ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE

2008: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST AGI CONFERENCE 483, 483 (Pei Wang et al. eds., 2008).
30.

RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 24, at 1-5.

Id. at 4. This combination of perception, adaptability, creativity, and autonomous
31.
operation reflects what would be required of an agent to pass the Turing test. Id. at 2-3.
32.
See id.
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learning that learns from examining large data sets, sometimes using
neural networks to make deep connections among the data. If these
computations do not display the other characteristics of AI, such as
operating autonomously, adapting to change, and creating and
pursuing their own goals, 33 then they cannot be Al. However, while
they cannot be AI based on the definitions above, machine learning
systems are also, perhaps erroneously, often referred to as possessing

AI.
This lack of definitional clarity means that the broad label "Al"
has become the vernacular term for a range of programs, algorithms,
For
and networks that are used in a multitude of applications.
example, AI is used to refer not only to the programs underlying
chess- and other game-playing programs, as well as Roomba vacuum
cleaners, 34 but also to the coordinated systems controlling autonomous
vehicleS 35 and the personal agents developed by Microsoft, Apple, and
Google, among others. 36 Some of these uses of the term Ad are
differentiated by descriptors such as "narrow AI" to distinguish their
limited application to a single set task. 37 But when AI is developed so
as to apply more broadly or with greater effectiveness, it is often
referred to as becoming "stronger" 38 rather than "broader."
Complicating this definitional problem further, research by
mathematicians and engineers who seek to develop self-replicating
and self-aware algorithms is also said to be work "in Ad." 3 9 There has
been some attempt to distinguish this work from narrow or even

See Liza Daly, AI Literacy: The Basics of Machine Learning, WORLD WRITABLE (Apr.
33.
11, 2017),
https://worldwritable.com/ai-literacy-the-basics-of-machine-learning-2e20f93e34b4
[https://perma.cc/P6UJ-FH4G].
34.

See ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE vi (Ben Goertzel & Cassio Pennachin eds.,

2007). These single-task applications are often classified as "narrow Al." See id.; see also
KURZWEIL, supra note 25, at 92. The bulk of AI research and development today is conducted
into this narrow type of Al. See Cassio Pennachin & Ben Goertzel, Contemporary Approaches to
Artificial General Intelligence, in ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, supra, at 1, 1.
35.

See PETER STONE ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE IN 2030, at 18-19

(2016),
https://ailOO.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ailOOreportlO032016fnl-singles.pdf
[https://perma.ccl5XZY-ATYS].
See Jamie Condliffe, In 2016, AI Home Assistants Won Our Hearts, MIT TECH. REV.
36.
(Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603228/in-2016-ai-home-assistants-won-ourhearts/.

See, e.g., Kai-Fu Lee, A Blueprint for Coexistence with Artificial Intelligence, WIRED
37.
(July 12, 2017, 6:50 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/a-blueprint-for-coexistence-with-artificialintelligence/.

KURZWEIL, supra note 25. This classification system refers to "narrow AI," as
38.
opposed to "strong Al." See id. Perhaps a clearer dichotomy would be to refer to "weak Al" and
"strong AI," but this Article retains the traditional classification.
Laurent Orseau, Asymptotic Non-Learnability of Universal Agents with Computable
39.
Horizon Functions, 473 THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI. 149, 149 (2013).
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stronger Al and algorithms that display these characteristics by
referring to it as "strong Al." A more common reference is artificial
general intelligence (AGI). As opposed to "narrow Al," AGI is said to
possess "a reasonable degree of self-understanding and autonomous
self-control, [has] the ability to solve a variety of complex problems in
a variety of contexts, and [can] learn to solve new problems that [it]
didn't know about at the time of [its] creation." 40 AGI is "subject to a
variety of 'drives' including self-protection, resource acquisition,
replication, goal preservation, efficiency, and self-improvement." 4 1 It
is generally recognized that AGI does not yet exist, but it is AGI that
causes most concern to those who believe that Al creates an
existential threat to humanity. The Authors discuss this further in
Part II.C below.
The range of applications of Al sits on a spectrum from those
applications that are not strictly AI, 42 through to narrow applications
of Al (as found in chess games, etc.), to AGI. When referring to Al,
then, the Authors must bear in mind this vast array of uses and
misuses of the term. It is neither possible nor even desirable to govern
all of these diverse uses of Al using one regulatory approach.
However, the risks associated with these different applications of Al
will arguably drive different regulatory responses and must therefore
be treated differently.
Accordingly, the Authors argue for a
classification based on the risk that various Al applications pose. For
public regulators that have limited resources and information,
classifying Al can inform their decisions about which applications or
class of Al to regulate first, and at what level.
B. IntroducingRisk as a Defining Point
The Authors propose that risk should be considered as a
quality that differentiates classes of Al. The Authors develop this idea
further in Part III; here, however, the Authors argue that once
applications of Al are classified according to the potential risk each
poses to society or to the people or environment in which they are
applied, then public regulators can more efficiently and effectively

40.

ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 34, at vi.

41.

Steve

Omohundro,

Rational Artificial Intelligence for the Greater Good, in

SINGULARITY HYPOTHESES: A SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 161, 161 (Amnon H.

Eden et al. eds., 2012).
42.
See, e.g., Adi Prakash, 'Doing AI' What Legal Should Remember About Big Data,
LEGALTECH NEWS (July 12, 2017), http://m.legaltechnews.com/?slreturn=20170726234213/#/
article/1202792798132/Doing-Al-What-Legal-Should-Remember-About-Big-Data?utm content=
bufferOlb0a&utm-medium=social&utm source=twitter.com&utm campaign=buffer&_almReferr
er=https:%2F%2Ft.co%2Fwki9DruH9A [https://perma.cc/63LL-XE2A].

2017]

NUDGING ROBOTS

397

direct their regulatory responses. Without that knowledge, they will
be grasping in the dark to even understand the regulatory problem. 43
Even categorizing risk in relation to AT is complicated by a lack
of clarity on AI's potential. On one hand is the pervasive fear that AI
will develop rapidly to the point at which it will annihilate humans as
a species, either through some miscalculation in replicating software
or because humans are suboptimal to the machine's set goals. When
talking about risk in relation to Al, it is these risks that linger just
below the surface of each argument. On the other hand, others argue
that the development of AI is benign and beneficial to society.
However, these arguments may be at cross-purposes, the Authors
argue, due to a lack of a sufficient and agreed-upon definition for Al.
The Authors suggest that classifying Al based upon potential risk
factors as suggested in this Article may clarify some of these
arguments so that regulation may be used where required to minimize
risks, while at the same time allowing development of less risky AI
with only minimal regulatory intervention. In this way, the Authors
can avoid suggesting the same regulatory response to the AI in a
Roomba, for example, as would be suggested to regulate autonomous
weapons systems or the comparatively simple algorithms that
regulate critical environmental or energy systems.
Part II.C discusses the arguments made in relation to the
existential risks posed by some in relation to Al. As discussed, these
arguments are often raised as reasons to regulate the development of
Then, Part II.D outlines concrete
AI, and must be addressed.
examples of problems associated with current applications of AI in use
today that the Authors argue also require a regulatory response-but
for more concrete reasons.
C. Reports of the Singularity and the End of Humanity
May Be Greatly Exaggerated
Perhaps the most visceral fear about the development of AI is
the existential threat to humanity that is said will be caused by the
43.
THE

See NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PREPARING FOR
(2016),
INTELLIGENCE
39
FUTURE
OF
ARTIFICIAL

https:/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehousefiles/microsites/ostplN
STC/preparingforthe future-of ai.pdf [http://perma.cc/BHL5-ZKAB]. The US government
has recognized this. See id. at 18 ("Agencies should draw on appropriate technical expertise at
the senior level when setting regulatory policy for Al-enabled products. Effective regulation of
Al-enabled products requires collaboration between agency leadership, staff knowledgeable
about the existing regulatory framework and regulatory practices generally, and technical
experts with knowledge of AL. Agency leadership should take steps to recruit the necessary
technical talent, or identify it in existing agency staff, and should ensure that there are sufficient
technical 'seats at the table' in regulatory policy discussions." (emphasis omitted)).
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rise of superintelligent machines. 4 4 These concerns pervade the
collective consciousness in relation to Al. The Authors argue that this
fear may be overstated given the current state of development in Al,
but it is so ubiquitous that it informs every level of discussion. It is
also addressed in every code of conduct, standard, or values statement
that has been developed by those in the industry4 5 and should be
addressed in any regulatory intervention.
In 1965, Irving John Good proposed that society would be
transformed by the invention of a machine with ultraintelligence. 46 It
would surpass human intelligence and be able to design even more
intelligent machines. 47 It would, he argued, be the last machine that
humans would ever need to make for themselveS 48 and would save
humanity. 49 Good argued that this ex machina in human image would
be designed from an understanding of human intellect.5 0 Good's
optimism was not shared by subsequent scholars, such as Vernor
Vinge, who saw superintelligent machines not as saviors but as the
advent of doomsday.5 1 Vinge's concern was that once the machine
attained human-level intelligence, it would not remain at that level for
long and would reach superintelligence and beyond very quickly. 52
Vinge argued that such a machine could become aware of its own
This event, which he described as the
superior intelligence.5 3
singularity, would spell the end of humanity. 54
These fears are not new and are not confined to fears of Al.
Age-old concerns in human mythology about humans playing "god the
creator" form the basis of stories such as Frankenstein and other

44.

See, e.g., Vernor Vinge, The Coming Technological Singularity:How to Survive in the

Post-Human Era, in VISION-21: INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IN THE ERA OF

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/
(1993),
11,
12-14
CYBERSPACE
19940022855.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LY3-C2RJ]. Writing fifteen years after Vinge, Kurzweil
appears most optimistic about the outcome of the singularity but maintains an element of
caution. See KURZWEIL, supra note 25, at 292-96; see also NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE:
PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 4-5, 279 (Keith Mansfield ed., 2014); Ray Kurzweil, Foreword to
JOHN VON NEUMANN, THE COMPUTER & THE BRAIN xi-xii (3d ed. 2012); Nick Bostrom, When
Machines Outsmart Humans, 35 FUTURES 759, 763-64 (2003).
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
45.
Irving John Good, Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine, 6
46.
ADVANCES IN COMPUTERS 31, 31 (1966).
Id. at 33.
47.
Id. at 31-32.
48.
Id. at 31.
49.
Id. at 78.
50.
Vinge, supra note 44, at 13.
51.
Id. at 14.
52.
53.
Id. at 13.
Id.
54.
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golem stories.55 These stories have parallels with, and lessons for, the
development of AGI. In the mythology, a golem is created, often from
clay, and imbued with life through "a detailed statement of specific
letter combinations that are required to bring about the 'birth' of a
golem" 5 6-comparable to the algorithm in Al. In some golem stories,
the golem obtains superhuman strength and, uncontrolled, causes
destruction and mayhem.57 The parallels to the creation of AGI with
superhuman intelligence are apt. A further parallel might be drawn
with the desire to regulate or control these fears. For example, golems
were bound by Jewish law. 8 They were programmed not to kill unless
necessary and could not lie.5 9 This demonstrates the birth of the idea
of embedding legal codes within technical code.60
Existential concerns have stimulated the minds of ethicists and
philosophers since soon after work began on AI. 6 1
However,
discussions about the legal ramifications of Al were typically slower to
develop, and early considerations of Al and the law only appear in the
early 1980s. 62 Even then, the dangers associated with the inability to
understand and control Al were apparent. 63 This problem has not
diminished and, if anything, has probably increased in the nearly forty
years since 1981. Researchers in Al recognize that there is a potential
risk that if autonomous AGI is developed, it will be difficult for a
human operator to maintain control. 64
Some of the risks seem remote or are, at this stage, only
But stories that portray the catastrophic
potential problems.
consequences of autonomous, self-aware Al-such as those portrayed
in science fiction, as well as the prophecies of researchers such as
Omohundro-pervade the zeitgeist and have begun to induce a level of
anxiety and fear that may well yet reach a tipping point in society's
consciousness. 6 5 People can be particularly risk averse when they
See, e.g., MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (3d ed. 1831); ELIE WIESEL, THE GOLEM:
55.
THE STORY OF A LEGEND (1983).
56.
JOSEPHA SHERMAN, STORYTELLING:
FOLKLORE 204 (Josepha Sherman ed., 2008).

AN

ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF

MYTHOLOGY

AND

57.

See WIESEL, supra note 55, at 25.

58.

SHERMAN, supra note 56, at 205.

59.

Id.

60.

See 1 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 18-19 (2d ed. 2008).

61.

See NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS 169-72 (2d ed. 1961).

62.

See Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig, Frankenstein Unbound: Towards a Legal Definition of

Artificial Intelligence, 13 FUTURES 442, 443 (1981).

63.
Id. at 446; see WIENER, supra note 61, at 175.
64.
See Omohundro, supra note 41, at 172.
65.
Malcolm Gladwell identified the three characteristics that identify what he described
as a "tipping point," particularly in epidemics, as "one, contagiousness; two, the fact that little
causes can have big effects; and three, that change happens not gradually but at one dramatic
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.

stand to lose something, 66 and governments respond to the desires and
concerns of the societies they govern. One aim of the law is to predict
what might go wrong and to design laws to prevent or avoid it.
It is characteristic of exponential growth that all the significant
effects of the growth occur in the last short timeframe at the end of the
growth set. Al has had a long gestation period. There have been
many failed predictions about the imminent explosion of Al over the
last sixty years, but, far from dissipating, the questions about Al's
impact will only become more urgent as we draw nearer to the
exponential inflection point and its growth takes a sudden and
dramatic vertical trajectory. The question is whether society, after
sixty years of growth, is now approaching that inflection point or is
still in the slower gradual development phase. The answer must be
that as society approaches the point where Al begins to develop more
quickly, society should begin to prepare for and guide the development
of Al in ways that will produce benefits while still avoiding existential
threats as best possible. This should be the role of the law, but
lawmaking processes are often criticized as being overly responsive or
reactive rather than sufficiently proactive.
Those within the Al industry have already taken steps to
counter concerns about AGI autonomously self-replicating out of
human control. For example, Laurent Orseau and Stuart Armstrong,
an engineer at DeepMind and a researcher into systemic risk,
respectively, acknowledged that "reinforcement learning agents . .
are unlikely to behave optimally all the time."67 They recognized
"concerns that a 'superintelligent' agent may resist being shut down,
because this would lead to a decrease of its expected reward,"68 and
detailed how DeepMind's engineers have developed a "big red button,"
or an off switch for such an artificially intelligent reinforcement
learning agent. Any regulation of AI might consider compulsory
adoption of this program in all research and development into AGI.
However, not everyone shares these concerns. The panel that
contributed to the Stanford Report on Al titled Artificial Intelligence
and Life in 2030 noted that

moment[.]" MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 9 (ed. 2000).

66.
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979).
Laurent Orseau & Stuart Armstrong, Safely Interruptible Agents, in UNCERTAINTY
67.
IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND CONFERENCE 557, 557

(Alexander Ihler et al. eds., 2016), http://www.auai.org/uai20l6/proceedings/uai-2016proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3M2-MQDG].
68.
Id. at 558.
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[C]ontrary to the more fantastic predictions for Al in the popular press, the Study
Panel found no cause for concern that AI is an imminent threat to humankind. No
machines with self-sustaining long-term goals and intent have been developed, nor
are they likely to be developed in the near future. Instead, increasingly useful
applications of AI, with potentially profound positive impacts on our society and
economy are likely to emerge between now and 2030[.]69

While threats to humankind posed by AI may yet be some way
off, it is important to listen to those in the industry who are calling for
controls to be put in place now to prepare for the future. If Al ever
does develop to a point where it becomes a threat to humanity, they
argue, it may well be too late to do anything about it. Far from
ignoring these fears and threats, any regulatory response to Al must
The more recent
address the risks Al poses in some manner.
warnings of technology entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and scientists
like Stephen Hawking about the risks of runaway Al should at least
cause regulators to pause and consider whether they have appropriate
risk identification and mitigation strategies in place. 70
The call to regulate comes not only from deep human fears of
the singularity but also because of more concrete problems associated
with the narrow AI that currently exists, has already been
implemented, and pervades our everyday lives. Part II.D analyzes
some of these unforeseen problems that are occurring now in current
applications of AL. These issues highlight the potential for unforeseen
errors to occur. These types of demonstrable errors and unforeseen
problems are the canary in the coalmine of Al development. They
provide warning about how things can go wrong when society and
governments allow Al systems to be developed and deployed without
appropriate regulation in place. Any regulatory response needs to
ensure that Al systems are designed and deployed so that they do not
pose any harm (in its broadest sense) to people or society.71

STONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 4.
69.
See, e.g., An Open Letter: Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial
70.
Intelligence, FUTURE OF LIFE INST., https://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter/ [https://perma.cc/S5499FV2] (last visited Oct. 30, 2017); see also Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Keeping Al Legal, 19
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 133, 145-46 (2016) (noting the concerns of "AI doomsayers" like
Stephen Hawking and cautioning that "AI programs should be subject to continual oversight to
ensure that their conduct does not stray from the boundaries set by human agents").
See Crawford & Calo, supra note 10, at 313 (referring to this concern as the blind
71.
spot in AI research).
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D. Problems Associated with CurrentApplications of Al
For the moment, the dystopian ramifications of rampant,
uncontrollable Al are still the imaginings of science fiction writers. 72
The current challenge for regulating AI is the proliferation in the
capabilities of relatively narrow Al systems tasked with performing
specific functions. 73
Developments in AI technology have been
smoldering since research on it began shortly after World War II.74
Today, Al is at the forefront of technological development and is used
in driverless vehicles, speech and facial recognition, language
translation, lipreading, combatting spain and online payment fraud,
detecting cancer, law enforcement, and logistics planning. Much of
this Al is what can be described as narrow Al-that is, Al designed to
solve a specific problem or familiar task, such as playing chess. These
commercial applications of Al appear to be limitless, and the world's
largest technology companies are investing heavily in its potential.
For example, IBM's cognitive computing platform, Watson, has
developed from its initial challenge of winning the game show
Jeopardy! to being applied to provide real solutions to problems in
commerce, law, and health.7 5 DeepMind's AlphaGo recently defeated
72.
See, e.g., A's Future Is Not So Scary, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://tribunecontentagency.com/article/ai039s-future-is-not-so-scary/
[https://perma.cc/2FRNSFFF] ("The odds that artificial intelligence will enslave or eliminate humankind within the next
decade or so are thankfully slim.").
73.
See KURZWEIL, supra note 25, at 264, 289, 409 (explaining that there is an
expectation that narrow Al will perform the task better or faster than human intelligence, given
the Al's capacity to manage and consider vast arrays of data and variables); see also Ben
Goertzel, Response, Human-Level Artificial General Intelligence and the Possibility of a
Technological Singularity: A Reaction to Ray Kurzweil's The Singularity Is Near, and
McDermott's Critique of Kurzweil, 171 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1161, 1162 (2007). Goertzel
notes that the distinguishing features of narrow Al are that it does not understand itself, the
task, or how to generalize or apply the knowledge it has learned in performing the task beyond
the specific problem. For example, a narrow Al program for diagnosing one type of cancer would

not itself be able to generalize its diagnostic insights to diagnose another type of cancer, though a
human might be able to further develop the first Al for the subsequent purpose. Id. at 1162.
74.
McCarthy, supra note 27.
75.
AI and Cognitive Computing, IBM RES., http://research.ibm.com/cognitivecomputing/ [https://perma.cc/BA2V-CKMC] (last visited Oct. 30, 2017) (describing Watson as "the
world's first and most-advanced Al platform"); see also STEPHEN BAKER, FINAL JEOPARDY: MAN
VS. MACHINE AND THE QUEST TO KNOW EVERYTHING (2011); Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I

Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1088-91 (2016);
Betsy Cooper, Judges in Jeopardy!: Could IBM's Watson Beat Courts at Their Own Game, 121
YALE L.J. FORUM 87 (2011); Jessica S. Allain, Comment, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The
Medical Liability Implications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L.
REV. 1049 (2013); Shanna Carpenter, Video: IBM Insiders Break Down Watson's Jeopardy! Win,
TED BLOG (Feb. 18, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://blog.ted.com/experts-and-ibm-insiders-break-downwatsons-jeopardy-win/ [https://perma.cc/B7GW-MEZ2]; IBM, IBM Watson: A System Designed
for Answers, YOUTUBE (Jan. 21, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-cU-AhmQ363I; IBM,
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the human master of the complex Chinese board game Go, and Google
also used DeepMind's Al to reduce the electricity consumption in
Google's data centers.76 Microsoft, meanwhile, has incorporated AI
into its personal agents such as Cortana and Zo, which can perform a
dizzying array of tasks and answer seemingly unlimited questions
using a mellifluous (female by design) computer-generated voice.7 7
Microsoft's algorithm DeeperCoder is capable of writing code to solve
simple problems. 78

And Facebook uses Al in its face recognition,

language translation, and camera effects, as well as in its research
arm-Facebook Artificial Intelligence Research (FAIR)-which is said
to be "committed to advancing the field of machine intelligence." 79
Joaquin Candela, Director of Engineering for Facebook's Applied
Machine Learning (AML) group, has stated that Facebook is working
towards a "generalization of AI"80 that will, it is argued, be capable of
enhancing the speed at which applications can be built by
"a hundred-x magnitude," expanding possibilities for impact in fields
ranging from medicine to transportation. 81 Advances in Al technology
are vaulting toward the exponential as computer capacity and speed

IBM
Watson:
How
It
Works,
YOUTUBE
(Oct.
7,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watchv= XcmhlLQB9I. IBM is currently tasking Watson with
learning how to help with the identification of melanoma and is seeking people's input to assist
Melanoma,
IBM
AUSTL.,
detection.
See
Outthink
with
timely,
accurate
https://www.ibm.com/cognitive/au-en/melanoma/ [https://perma.cclFT97-W2SS] (last visited Oct.
30, 2017). Commercial applications of Watson include, for example, ROSS Intelligence's software
marketed to lawyers as their "own personal artificially intelligent researcher ... that effortlessly
reads through and finds numerous answers for any legal question." ROSS Intelligence, Meet

ROSS,

Your

Brand New

Artificially Intelligent Lawyer,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-ZFOJQOAKOE.

YOUTUBE

(Dec.

28,

2016),

ROSS can be asked questions in natural

language, just as one might ask "any other lawyer." See Mark Gediman, Artificial Intelligence:
Not Just Sci-Fi Anymore, 21 AM. ASS'N L. LIBR. SPECTRUM, Sept.-Oct. 2016, at 34, 35-36; Paul
Lippe, What We Know and Need to Know About Watson, Esq., 67 S.C. L. REV. 419, 420 (2016);
ROSS Intelligence, supra.
See, e.g., DeepMind Collaborationswith Google, supra note 4.
76.
77.
Microsoft's AI Vision, Rooted in Research, Conversations, MICROSOFT NEWS CTR.,
https://news.microsoft.com/features/microsofts-ai-vision-rooted-in-research-conversations/

[https://perma.ce/T95Y-ADBC] (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
78.
Dave Gershgorn, Microsoft's AI Is Learning to Write Code by Itself, Not Steal It,
QUARTZ (Mar. 1, 2017), https://qz.com/920468/artificial-intelligence-created-by-microsoft-and[http://perma.cc/875Muniversity-of-cambridge-is-learning-to-write-code-by-itself-not-steal-it/
MC6U].
Facebook AI Research (FAIR), FACEBOOK RES., https://research.fb.com/category/
79.
facebook-ai-research-fair (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
80.
Steven Levy, Inside Facebook's AI Machine, WIRED (Feb. 23, 2017, 12:00 AM),
[https://perma.cc/C42Whttps:/fbackchannel.com/inside-facebooks-ai-machine-7a869b922ea7
BL391.
Id.
81.
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double every two years. 8 2 The Stanford Report predicts that as
driverless cars fall into common use, they will form the first public
impressions of AI in a corporeal form.8 3 This experience will be an
important one for AI since we are on the cusp of a surge of AI with a
physical embodiment.8 4 The Stanford Report also predicts that, by
2030, the typical North American city will feature personal robots,
driverless trucks, and flying cars.85
These Al systems present a spectrum of immediate issues that
may require a regulatory response. Some are likely to be dealt with
by developers as they come to their attention, and end users of the
system may deal with others as they refine their use of the system and
work with developers in overcoming issues as and when they arise.
This Section outlines several of the issues that may require a
regulatory response, including biases that appear in law enforcement
decisions made by Al systems; safety, particularly in relation to
driverless cars; the lack of a human "heart" when relying on Al in
judicial decision making; privacy in relation to a vast number of
with
associated
problems
pressing
the
and
applications;
unemployment caused by increasing rates of automation supported by

Al.
1. Bias
The coalescing of AI and big data opens significant possibilities
for the synthesis and analysis of that data, but it also stands to
These
compound problems that presently exist in that process.
include unintended racism, sexism, and discrimination in the
outcomes of data analysis.8 6 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, and Joel
82.
This is known as "Moore's Law," after the cofounder of Intel who predicted in 1965
that computing power would double every year (later revised to every two years). See Tom
Simonite, Moore's Law Is Dead. Now What?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 13, 2016),
is
some
There
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601441/moores-law-is-dead-now-what/.
speculation that this rate of change is no longer happening. See id.; see also PEDRO DOMINGOS,
THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE

OUR WORLD 287 (2015) (stating that Moore's Law "is on its last legs").
83.

STONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 18.

Id. at 15-16 (noting advancements in robotics, computer vision, natural language
84.
processing, and collaborative systems that are required to embody AI or give it functionality).
See id. at 18-23 (automated vehicles); id. at 24-25 (home robots); id. at 7, 18, 20
85.
(flying vehicles).
86.
Kate Crawford, Can an Algorithm Be Agonistic? Ten Scenes from Life in Calculated
Publics, 41 Scl. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 77, 82-83 (2016) [hereinafter Crawford, Can an
Algorithm Be Agonistic?]; Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence's White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES
(June 25, 2016) [hereinafter Crawford, Artificial Intelligence's White Guy Problem],
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guyproblem.html [http://perma.cc/B4H2-B5G6]; Yoni Har Carmel & Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar,
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S. Ford have proposed a model to regulate big data both to address
privacy concerns and to allow a pathway to correct erroneous
assumptions made from an assemblage of that data.8 7 Bias can be
difficult to detect and, if care is not taken, can "become part of the
logic of everyday algorithmic systems."8 8 These biases have arisen in
a law enforcement context: algorithms performing predictive risk
assessments of defendants committing future crimes were making
errors with risk scores for black defendants, giving them high risk
scores at almost double the rate of white defendants. 89 Conversely,
risk scores were erroneously low for white defendants. 90 Bias also
arises in the work of private platforms that filter, index, and sort
online content and mediate communications. 91 Crawford sees at least
some of this as a manifestation of a bias problem with data and calls
for vigilance in AI system design and training to avoid built-in bias. 92
Bias issues such as these are unlikely to provoke a regulatory
response if they are dealt with in Al system design. However, these
issues can be ameliorated with regulation that requires either careful
design or prompt troubleshooting when the issues are identified.
2. Safety
AI is being touted as a solution to a number of social problems.
However, when it is implemented in a social context, it also presents a
range of safety issues. 9 3 For example, autonomous vehicles such as

&

Reshaping Ability Grouping Through Big Data, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 87, 110 (2017)
(discussing how historical inequalities can cause algorithms to select for similar biases in future
datasets).
87.
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Joel S. Ford, Health and Big Data: An Ethical
Framework for Health Information Collection by Corporate Wellness Programs, 44 J.L. MED.
ETHICS 474, 476 (2016).
88.
Crawford, Artificial Intelligence's White Guy Problem, supra note 86.
89.
Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There's Software Used Across the Country to
Predict Future Criminals. And It's Biased Against Blacks., PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing

[http://perma.cc/3XDB-7FWX].
90.
Id.
91.

Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS

ON COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167, 188 (Tarleton Gillespie et al. eds., 2014);
Nicolas Suzor, Digital Constitutionalism: Using the Rule of Law to Evaluate the Legitimacy of
Governance
by Platforms
12-13
(Sept.
2016)
(unpublished symposium
paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2909889 [https://perma.cclJP7N-FRBL].
92.
Crawford, Artificial Intelligence's White Guy Problem, supra note 86; Dark Days: Al
and the Rise of Fascism, SXSW: SCHEDULE, http://schedule.sxsw.com/2017/events/PP93821
[https://perma.cc/999V-FZ36] (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George Bekey, Robot Ethics: Mapping the Issues for a
93.
Mechanized World, 175 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 942, 945-46 (2011); Drew Simshaw et al.,
Regulating Healthcare Robots: Maximizing Opportunities While Minimizing Risks, 22 RICH. J.L.
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cars and trucks have the potential to improve safety on roads if they
succeed in reducing accidents caused by driver error such as
inattention, impairment, slow reaction times, and inappropriate
risk-taking.9 4 Social benefits potentially include improving mobility
for those unable to drive or those who live in heavily traffic-congested
urban areas. 95 Hence, there is an urgency to deploy autonomous
vehicles, and developers have already been testing autonomous
vehicles on public roads. Indeed, the authors of the Stanford Report
expect that "[t]ransportation is likely to be one of the first domains in
which the general public will be asked to trust the reliability and
safety of an AI system for a critical task." 9 6
However, the safety risks present in autonomous vehicles
include the risk of accidents that may not otherwise have occurred;
accidents created by even minor software or hardware errors; flawed
or deficient programming of software; or unethical decision-making in
the face of a high-risk, multi-risk scenario. 97 Regulation is key to
providing an environment that will give the technology a chance to
develop to its full potential while protecting the public from
Public regulators are already developing
unacceptable risks.9 8
regulatory frameworks for safety assurance during the development

& TECH. 1, 9 (2015). See generally Eliezer Yudkowsky, Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting
Judgment of Global Risks, in GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISKS 91 (Nick Bostrom & Milan M.
6irkovid eds., 2008) (remarking that the most powerful and beneficial technologies also exhibit
the greatest potential risks to society).
94.
See STONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 19-21.
95.
Id. at 18; see JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT
WILL TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 78-83 (2013) (identifying

government regulation as potentially both an enabler and barrier to the socioeconomic benefits of
autonomous vehicles).
96.

STONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 18.

97.
Lin, Abney & Bekey, supra note 93, at 945. Programming issues may be highly
specific and unique to certain cultures, geographical terrain, or indigenous fauna. See, for
example, reports that Volvo is working on difficulties arising with the animal detection system in
its autonomous vehicles when confronted with the unusual way in which kangaroos move. Jake
Evans, Driverless Cars: Kangaroos Throwing off Animal Detection Software, ABC NEWS AUSTL.
(June 23, 2017, 5:28 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-24/driverless-cars-in-australiaface-challenge-of-roo-problem/8574816 [http://perma.cclPJ6S-ZVG4]. The system had previously
been tested on moose in Sweden. Id.
98.
Upon the introduction of the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy in the United
States, President Obama noted: "[T]he quickest way to slam the brakes on innovation is for the
public to lose confidence in the safety of new technologies." Barack Obama, Opinion, Barack
Obama: Self-Driving, Yes, But Also Safe, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Sept. 19, 2016, 7:00 PM),
http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/20 16/09/19/Barack-Obama-Self-driving-yes-but-alsosafe/stories/201609200027; see U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY:
ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY 6 (2016).
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and testing phases. 99 These frameworks extend to design standards,
vehicle modification, and the development of safety principles, criteria,
and assurance standards that are efficient, affordable, and create a
minimal "administrative burden." 100
The success of Al in solving social problems will ultimately lie
in public and regulatory confidence in its use, and much of this
confidence will turn upon trust in safety assurance. 101 Safety, in this
sense, ought not to be confined to physical safety but should extend to
concern for nonphysical harm, 102 such as privacy, security, and the
dehumanization of care for people at their most vulnerable. 103 For
example, the benefit of Al-enabled healthcare robots could be impeded
by lack of regulation to assure public trust and confidence across a
range of safety issues including these types of nonphysical harm.
These risks are most acute with personal care robots. Trust
and confidence in Al-assisted robots may be hard-won in personal care
situations,
given
that
they
have
traditionally
involved
human-to-human interaction. 104 Also, to be effective and efficient,
personal care robots must be able to access personal and medical
information, "known[ . . . and possibly shar[e] the location of

99.

See, e.g., Strassenverkehrsgesetz [SVG] [Road Traffic Act], Dec. 19, 1958, SR 741.01

(Switz.); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 98, at 7; NAT'L TRANSPORT COMM'N (AUSTL.),
NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR AUTOMATED VEHICLE TRIALS (2016); Pilot Project-Automated
Vehicles, 0. Reg. 306/15 (Can.); DEP'T FOR TRANSPORT (UK), THE PATHWAY TO DRIVERLESS CARS:
A CODE OF PRACTICE FOR TESTING (2015). Articles 8 and 39 of the UN Convention on Road

Traffic were amended to facilitate use of autonomous vehicles on public roads while ensuring the
driver of the vehicle maintained her position in a superior role. Inland Transp. Comm., Rep. of
the Sixty-Eighth Session of the Working Party on Road Traffic Safety, U.N. Doc.
ECE/trans/WP.1/145, at 9-10 (2014) (amending the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, Nov. 8,
1968, 1042 U.N.T.S. 17, 24, 43). The justifications for the amendment to the Convention on Road
Traffic are included as an appendix to that document. See id. at 11.
100.
NAT'L TRANSPORT COMM'N AUSTL., supra note 99, at 34; Current Projects: Automated
Vehicle Trial Guidelines, NAT'L TRANSPORT COMMISSION (AUSTL.), http://www.ntc.gov.au/currentprojects/automated-vehicle-trial-guidelines/ [http://perma.cc/ZN4W-WZHM] (last updated May
31, 2017).
101.
STONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 35-36; see Simshaw et al., supra note 93, at 8-10.
102.
See David D. Luxton, Susan Leigh Anderson & Michael Anderson, Ethical Issues
and Artificial Intelligence Technologies in Behavioral and Mental Health Care, in ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN BEHAVIORAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE 255, 255 (David D. Luxton ed., 2016);

&

Simshaw et al., supra note 93, at 8-10; Bernd Carsten Stahl & Mark Coeckelbergh, Ethics of
Healthcare Robotics: Towards Responsible Research and Innovation, 86 ROBOTICS
AUTONOMOUS SYS. 152, 154 (2016).
103.
Healthcare robots include surgical, routine-task, and personal care robots. See
Luxton, Anderson & Anderson, supra note 102, at 255; Simshaw et al., supra note 93, at 9-10;
Stahl & Coeckelbergh, supra note 102, at 154, 157.
104.
Laurel D. Riek, Robotics Technology in Mental Health Care, in ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN BEHAVIORAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 102, at 185, 194.
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medication, objects, and people,"10 5 connect with hospital or other
healthcare networks, and connect with networked technology such as
personal devices including phones, wearable devices, or mobile
applications. 10 6 The unprecedented amount of personal and medical
information that could potentially be accessed, used, processed, and
stored by personal care robots is vulnerable to the same privacy and
security concerns raised in relation to the Internet of Things. 107 Aside
from these security and privacy concerns, the healthcare context may
raise unique safety concerns, for example, if an external party can
hack medical devices such as pacemakers.10 8 These risks escalate
with unsophisticated home users. 109 As a result, society should give
careful consideration to regulation that can address these concerns.
3. Legal Decision-Making
Al has been applied in highly specific legal tasks such as
sentencing and judicial interpretation in an effort to improve
transparency and consistency in judicial decisions. 110 However, these
systems have been criticized as lacking capacity to exercise discretion
and make situational value judgments.1 1 1 Concerns have been raised
about mechanistic reliance upon these applications of Al and their

105.
Simshaw et al., supra note 93, at 11-12.
106.
Id. at 13-15.
107.
See Lin, Abney & Bekey, supra note 93, at 945; Simshaw et al., supra note 93, at 2.
Similarly, complex safety issues arise with the noncommercial or recreational use of drones. See
generally Roger Clarke & Lyria Bennett Moses, The Regulation of Civilian Drones' Impacts on
Public Safety, 30 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 263 (2014).
108.
See David D. Luxton et al., Intelligent Mobile, Wearable, and Ambient Technologies
for Behavioral Health Care, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN BEHAVIORAL AND MENTAL HEALTH
CARE, supra note 102, at 137, 156; Simshaw et al., supra note 93, at 22.
109.
Simshaw et al., supra note 93, at 22.
110.
See Trevor Bench-Capon & Henry Prakken, Argumentation, in INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY AND LAWYERS 61, 62 (Arno R. Lodder & Anja Oskamp eds., 2006); Maria Jean J.
Hall et al., Supporting Discretionary Decision-Making with Information Technology: A Case
Study in the Criminal Sentencing Jurisdiction, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 31 (2005),
http://www.uoltj.ca/articles/vol2.1/2005.2.1.uoltj.Hall. 1-36.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SRU-VNKD].
111.
See URI J. SCHILD, EXPERT SYSTEMS AND CASE LAW 121 (1992); Hall et al., supra
note 110, at 8-9; Philip Leith, The Judge and the Computer: How Best 'Decision Support'?, 6
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 289, 294-96 (1998); Paul Lippe, Daniel Martin Katz & Dan
Jackson, Legal by Design: A New Paradigmfor Handling Complexity in Banking Regulation and
Elsewhere in Law, 93 OR. L. REV. 833, 849 (2015); Brian Simpson, Algorithms or Advocacy: Does
the Legal ProfessionHave a Future in a Digital World?, 25 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 50, 56 (2016);
John Zeleznikow, Building Decision Support Systems in DiscretionaryLegal Domains, 14 INT'L
REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 341, 343 (2000).
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capacity to influence and shape the behavior of people involved in the
decision-making process. 112
Decision-making in the application of legal principles
necessarily involves discretion. Decision-making in sentencing relies
on "induction and intuition as well as the capacity to assess the social
impact of decisions." 113 These have not yet proven to be among Al's
greatest strengths. There is a significant body of scholarship that
argues against using Al in making definitive legal decisions 114 and
cautions against even a narrowly limited role for Al in informing
human decisions.11 5 As Brian Simpson argued, even if Al is able to
approximate human discretion in sentencing decision-making, the
question that remains is the extent to which "an algorithm [can] have
a heart."1 16 Simpson questions whether "such algorithms [can] deal
with the unexpected, quirky[,J or unique individual that may require
appeals to a sense of justice[.]" 1 1 7 Paul Lippe, Daniel Katz, and Dan
Jackson propose that an optimal combination of Al and humans is
required to provide balance.1 18
These concerns animate Article 22 of the European Union's
General Data Protection Regulation, which creates a new right for
individuals "not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her." 119 The
implication, at least in Europe, is that beginning in 2018 a human
must somehow be involved in making the decisions. How effective this

112.
See Hall et al., supra note 110, at 33; Anja Oskamp & Maaike W. Tragter,
Automated Legal Decision Systems in Practice:The Mirror of Reality, 5 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
& L. 291, 293 (1997); Abdul Paliwala, Rediscovering Artificial Intelligence and Law: An
Inadequate Jurisprudence?, 30 INT'L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 107, 112-13 (2016); Steven P.
R. Rose & Hilary Rose, 'Do Not Adjust Your Mind, There Is a Fault in Reality'-Ideology in
Neurobiology, 2 COGNITION 479, 498-99 (1973); Simpson, supra note 111, at 56.
113.
Hall et al., supra note 110, at 9.
114.
See Cooper, supra note 75, at 97-99; Leith, supra note 111; Philip Leith, The
Emperor's New Expert System, 50 MOD. L. REV. 128, 128-32 (1987); Philip Leith, The Rise and
Fall of the Legal Expert System, 1 EUR. J.L. & TECH. (2010), http://ejlt.org/article/view/14/1
[https://perma.ccB4K9-ATNE]; Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning,
8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 29, 34-35 (2001). See generally John 0. McGinnis & Russell G.
Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in
the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2014).
115.
See SCHILD, supra note 111, at 121; Lippe, Katz & Jackson, supra note 111, at 4, 13,
20; Paliwala, supra note 112, at 112-13; Zeleznikow, supra note 111, at 343.
Simpson, supra note 111, at 56.
116.
Id.
117.
118.
See Lippe, Katz & Jackson, supra note 111, at 849.
119.
Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 22(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 46 (EU),
[http://perma.cc/
http://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016RO679
L3NR-U4NU].
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is likely to be remains to be seen. Public regulators in all jurisdictions
similarly ought to consider the risks of allowing the involvement of Al
in making automated final legal decisions.
Even where the decision is not automated but Al is used to
support human decision-making, public regulators ought to be wary of
undesirable risks and consequences. Reliance upon Al systems in
judicial decision-making enlivens long-standing fears that reducing
human processes to their most mechanistic may have an unintended
regulatory effect. 120 That is, once a process is reduced to its most
mechanistic, it may make the humans involved in the decision-making
process more compliant or programmable to the process. 121 Even
where the goal and purpose of involving Al in legal decision-making is
to increase consistency, there are still risks that it will lead to
standardization, 1 2 2 which in automated legal decision-making
processes can have a regulatory effect on the people involved. 123 This
regulatory impact may extend to an unintended chilling effect on
individualization even where the legislature intended there to be some
flexibility. 124 People involved in the decision-making process may
have difficulty deviating from the standardization in order to, for
example, "have a heart," 12 5 "introduce an element of humanity in
special circumstances," 1 2 6 or consider whether the decision is in the
best interests of society. 127
The array of concerns surrounding the use of Al systems in
judicial decision-making is likely to be managed by the continual
refinement of how Al systems are deployed by people in the
decision-making process and should ultimately be regulated.
4. Privacy
The leaps in advancement that are the promise of Al will
sometimes turn on the quality and quantity of information available
to it to inform Al learning. Public regulators will need to regulate to
protect the privacy of individuals if large data sets are disclosed to
tech companies with Al capabilities.
For example, maintaining
patient privacy should be paramount where data sets held by public
health services are shared with technology companies. This should be
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Rose & Rose, supra note 112, at 498-99.
Id.
Hall et al., supra note 110, at 33.
Oskamp & Tragter, supra note 112, at 293.
See id.
Simpson, supra note 111, at 56.
Hall et al., supra note 110, at 33.
See Oskamp & Tragter, supra note 112, at 292; Paliwala, supra note 112, at 112-13.
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so even where data is disclosed for a specific purpose and is technically
compliant with current regulatory disclosure models.
Even so,
sensitivities surrounding well-intentioned disclosures should result in
a regulatory response, even where the disclosure technically complies
with existing regulatory processes. 128 Such a regulatory response may
result from the existing regulatory compliance process failing to
contemplate the scale of the disclosure, the use to which the data is
put by Al systems, or how the data might be used and stored by
private entities not previously considered an interested stakeholder in
that type of data at the time the regulatory process was settled. 129
Such a regulatory response may involve the imposition of a command
and control model heavily restricting future access to such data sets.
5. Unemployment
The socioeconomic and sociopolitical impact of AI is a serious
risk for public regulators. The deployment of Al in workplaces via
algorithms, robotics, or automation targeting increased speed,

128.
See, for example, the debate surrounding the disclosure of private health data of an
estimated 1.3 million UK patients in a collaboration between DeepMind and the Royal Free
London NHS Foundation Trust in the United Kingdom. See Suleyman, supra note 6; see also
ROYAL FREE LONDON NHS FOUND. TR. (May 4, 2016),
Google DeepMind: Q&A,
https://www.royalfree.nhs.uk/news-medianews/google-deepmind-qa/
[https://perma.cc/F4VSCDB9]. DeepMind has provided information about its Independent Reviewers involved in the
DEEPMIND,
Independent
Review
Panel,
NHS
project.
DeepMind
Health's
https://deepmind.com/applied/deepmind-health/transparency-independent-reviewers/

independent-reviewers/ [https://perma.cclS8YS-N5D5] (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). The relevant
statute in the United Kingdom applicable to the disclosure of this type of data is the Data
Protection Act 1998, legislation primarily regulated by the Information Commissioner's Office
(ICO). See Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29, sch. 5 (Eng.). The ICO, with the assistance of the
National Data Guardian, is currently reviewing these disclosures for compliance with all
appropriate regulatory processes for exchange of this data. DeepMind and the Royal Free
London NHS Foundation Trust have stated their belief that they satisfied all appropriate
regulatory processes for these data exchanges. See DeepMind Health's Independent Review

Panel, supra; Google DeepMind: Q&A, supra. The National Data Guardian has reportedly
completed its report for the ICO. See INFO. COMM'R'S OFFICE, ENF0605979, DATA PROTECTION
ACT

1998
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(2017),

https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-

[https://perma.cc/
taken/undertakings/2013395/hscic-nhs-digital-undertaking-follow-up.pdf
NE3N-BURL]; Jane Wakefield, Google DeepMind's NHS Deal Under Scrutiny, BBC NEWS (Mar.
17, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39301901 [http://perma.cc/8CXT-PANY]. The
debate surrounding this disclosure is explored in Julia Powles & Hal Hodson, Google DeepMind
and Healthcare in an Age of Algorithms, HEALTH TECH., Jan. 2016, at 1-17,
http://1ink.springer.com/10.1007/sl2553-017-0179-1 [https://perma.cc/RS8E-2RH7].
129.
See Sam Shead, The UK Data Regulator Has Ruled That Google DeepMind's First
Deal with the NHS Was Illegal, BUS. INSIDER AUSTL. (July 3, 2017, 9:48 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com.aulico-deepmind-first-nhs-deal-illegal-2017-6
[https://perma.cc/5DYH-ATAH].
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efficiency, or safety is expected to radically change the workforce. 130
These concerns speak to a fundamental issue beyond the economics of
increased productivity. The sheer scale of the disruptive impact on
wages and employment is unlikely to be matched by increased
productivity and may instead "exacerbate inequality rather than
promote greater opportunity and shared prosperity." 13 1 Regulators
must consider issues such as the benefits that society can attain from
Al and how regulators can support workers through the expected job
displacement if the scale of that displacement is anything approaching
Public regulators need to consider the
the levels anticipated.
socioeconomic and sociopolitical disequilibrium that might result if the
Al revolution causes widespread unemployment.
Ultimately,
regulators must consider if society will require a living wage paid for
by taxes on robots. 132
Adverse impacts on employment will not be confined to
manufacturing or blue-collar work where robots are already used. 133
While unskilled routine tasks that lend themselves to automation are
at high risk, jobs that are highly skilled involving high levels of
dexterity, creativity, social intelligence, collaboration, negotiation, and
problem solving will also be at risk with further advances in
technology. 134 Every robot introduced into the workplace is estimated

130.
See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How
Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254, 261
(2017). McKinsey's occupational study estimates that 51 percent of US jobs ($2.7 trillion of
wages) could be automated by 2055, or decades earlier depending on the pace of technological
development. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., A FUTURE THAT WORKS:
AUTOMATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY 6, 12 (2017) , http://www.mckinsey.com/global-

[https://perma.cc/
themes/digital-disruption/harnessing-automation-for-a-future-that-works
4VXX-N2Y4]. The World Bank estimates that 57 percent of jobs in the OECD nations could be
displaced. See WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: DIGITAL DIVIDENDS 129

[https://perma.cc/E76Qfig.2.24
(2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2016
QMAY].
131.
WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 130, at 249 (emphasis omitted); see Daron Acemoglu
& Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets 7-10 (MIT Dep't of
Econ., Working Paper No. 17-04, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2940245.

132.
Compare Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot That Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says
Bill Gates, QuARTZ (Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-yourjob-should-pay-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/ZS2Q-EPLR] (noting Bill Gates's belief "that governments
should tax companies' use of [robots] ... to fund other types of employment"), with Why Taxing
Robots Is Not a Good Idea, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/financeand-economics/217 17374-bill-gatess-proposal-revealing-about-challenge-automation-poses-whytaxing [https://perma.cc/5F3J-UTUB] (criticizing Gates's proposal because, inter alia, increasing
the expense of robotic labor "might further delay an already overdue productivity boom").
See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 131, at 1, 5.
133.
134.

MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 130, at 49-50; see WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 130, at

125-26; Frey & Osborne, supra note 130, at 255-58.
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to have a sizable impact on wages and employment rates. 135 As the
use of robots in workplaces increases, the aggregate effect on
employment and wages is expected to increase, as well. 13 6
The pace of change and the sheer extent of displacement
caused by the effects of automation, robots, and AI on wages and
employment will be unprecedented. Workers will be marginalized and
forced to "upskill" to find work. 137 The World Bank has cautioned that
public regulators are "in a race between skills and technology," and for
many skills, "people are losing the race." 138 At least part of the answer
is to reform education and training, but as the World Bank has
observed, these types of reforms have such a long lag time until they
can prove effective that targeted educational reforms must begin at a
young age. 139 Therefore, a regulatory response needs to consider
support for education, training, and transitioning displaced workers
through the process of job disruption and reemployment. 14 0 Public
regulators ought to influence education and training agendas now to
ensure the development of resilient, transferrable, and not easily
automated skills that lend themselves to a lifetime of working with
and adapting to technological change. 14 1 Longer working lifetimes and
the pace of technological development may see low-skilled workers
experience this type of job disruption more than once.
This Part outlined examples of problems associated with
current applications of Al systems that will provoke a regulatory
response. The examples provided illustrate concrete problems and the
possibility of far greater, even existential, problems if the development
of AI is left unattended. As set out in the next Part, regulating Al
systems is an extremely difficult problem to solve. Formulating the
regulatory response will be a challenging one for any regulator. As
specific
problems
manifest,
fear,
anxiety,
or
populist
concerns-whether evidence-based or not-may create an urge in the
regulator to step in. However, the Authors argue for a considered,
principled, and consultative approach.

Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 131, at 36 (observing that this impact will only be
135.
marginally correlated with the more usual effects of imports, other technologies, and the natural
attrition of "routine jobs").
Id. at 35-36.
136.
137.
WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 130, at 130.
Id. at 131.
138.
139.
Id.
140.

MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 130, at 18.

141.

WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 130, at 131.
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III. THE DIFFICULTY IN REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Even in the simplest of industries, "[r]egulation is
extraordinarily difficult." 142 When considering the regulation of new
technologies, former justice of the High Court of Australia Michael
Kirby noted that "the normal organs of legal regulation often appear
powerless." 143
Further along that continuum, regulating the
development of AI may be the hardest task yet for regulators to tackle.
Regulation is often implemented as a means to avoid or limit
risks to human health or safety, to the environment, or against some
moral hazard such as gene manipulation. 14 4 However, the real risks of
AI may yet be unknown and are perhaps unknowable.
This
necessarily makes them difficult to evaluate for the purposes of risk
assessment, which involves balancing a range of social attitudes and
will often reflect the culture and values of the society in which it is
deployed. However, it is clear that the variety of applications of Al in
operation today poses a range of risks.
A. The Range of Risks Associated with AI and AGI
Part II outlined a range or spectrum of classes of Al-from
narrow Al through to AGI. However, the level of risk associated with
the applications within each class does not directly correlate to the
class. The applications of Al within a single class could pose a range
of risks from low to moderate to high. Further, an application of Al in
the narrow class may have the potential to become stronger as the Al
learns or develops. Whether that Al could then develop into AGI and
thus pose a greater risk is often unknowable. Still further, the type of
risk posed by each application may not be the same within each class
of Al. For example, with a particular application of Al, there might be
a low risk to safety or to human life, but a high risk of a breach of
privacy, or a high risk of causing unemployment. Therefore, it is too
simplistic to merely take a class of Al such as narrow AI and to seek to
regulate it based upon a presumed level of risk. An additional
complicating factor is that similar types of application will be used
differently in different industries or areas. For example, the same
narrow Al application used in a product in the aviation industry may
142.

Bridget M. Hutter, A Risk Regulation Perspective on Regulatory Excellence, in

ACHIEVING REGULATORY EXCELLENCE 101, 101 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2017).

143.

Michael Kirby, New Frontier: Regulating Technology by Law and "Code", in

REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 14, at 367, 383.

144.
See Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword, Emerging Technologies, Extreme
Uncertainty, and the Principleof Rational PrecautionaryReasoning, 4 LAW INNOVATION & TECH.
35, 35 (2012).
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be applied to a different product in an agricultural setting. This will
very likely mean that different regulatory agencies will be required to
regulate the same Al, but in different applications. Taking this
complication one step further, the risk posed by the application's use
in the agricultural setting may be lower than when the same Al is
applied in the aviation industry. Therefore, the same Al application
will have to be treated differently by two separate agencies.
Public regulators must become informed about the AI used in
their field, assess the risks posed by the Al application as it is used in
the industry in which they operate, and regulate appropriately.
Earlier research has acknowledged that the reliability and fidelity of
organizations involved ought to be evaluated based on factors
including the intended use to which the technology might be put.1 45
Armed with a deeper understanding of the industry and the intended
use of the Al, stakeholders involved in informing the regulatory
approach will be better placed to ask the right questions to assuage, or
at least contextualize, their concerns about levels of risk. Iterative
and cooperative involvement of all stakeholders, including public
regulators, is key to avoiding the necessity to hastily adopted
command and control regulatory action and its unintended
consequences. 14 6 The Authors must therefore consider the type of risk
that different classes and types of AI pose-starting with a look at the
systemic nature of Al risk that exists even now.
B. Systemic Risk
Not all applications of Al will eventuate in a "singularity" scale
event.147 However, immediate systemic risk issues are present with
145.
See Phil Macnaghten & Jason Chilvers, Governing Risky Technologies, in CRITICAL
RISK RESEARCH: PRACTICES, POLITICS AND ETHICS 99, 102 (Matthew Kearnes et al. eds., 2012);
see also Jessica L. Carlo, Kalle Lyytinen & Richard J. Boland, Systemic Risk, Information
Technology Artifacts, and High Reliability Organizations: A Case of Constructing a Radical
57,
58
(2004),
http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/
Architecture,
4
SPROUTS
viewcontent.cgi?article=1144&context=icis2004 [https://perma.cc/HW36-87WC].
146.
See Macnaghten & Chilvers, supra note 145, at 100. Note that Cass R. Sunstein
outlined a number of paradoxes that can be brought about by inappropriate regulation: imposing
stringent regulations may lead to the regulator's own administrators failing to act or refusing to
enforce the regulations. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
407, 416 (1990). Further, regulations that "impos[e] costs exclusively on new sources or entrants
can be self-defeating." Id. at 417. By way of example, Sunstein noted that stringent regulation of
nuclear facilities had "perpetuated the risks produced by coal, a significantly more dangerous
power source." Id. at 418. Sunstein argued that these paradoxes (among others) must be borne in
mind when introducing regulation. Id. at 413.
Goertzel, supra note 73, at 1162. For a a more complete discussion of systemic risk,
147.
see Marjolein B.A. van Asselt & Ortwin Renn, Risk Governance, 14 J. RISK RES. 431, 436-38
(2011). Systemic risk has been studied in a technology context. See Carlo, Lyytinen & Boland,
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existing Al applications. 1 48 Systemic risk is the embedded risk "to
human health and the environment . . . in a larger context of social,
financial and economic risks and opportunities." 14 9 Systemic risks
exist in an atmosphere of uncertainty, and they are not restrained by
sector, domain, or geography. 15 0 Assessed at its height, strong AI or
AGI presents inherent systemic risk.15 1
However, the integrated
nature and embeddedness of even narrow Al's deployment into
complex, interdependent social, financial, and economic systems or
networks amplifies the potential for risk impact, particularly where Al
is deployed in a pervasive way. 152 The more complex and nonlinear
these networks are, the easier it is for the impacts of an Al "incident"
to proliferate rapidly throughout the network, affecting multiple
stakeholders. 15 3 Systemic risks are problematic for regulation. While
supra note 145, at 58. Numerous studies have been conducted into how the law should deal with
unknown risks. See, e.g., Jaap Spier, Uncertainties and the State of the Art: A Legal Nightmare,
14 J. RISK RES. 501 (2011). Paradoxically, Al may be able to assist with the management of
systemic risk. See Jerzy Balicki et al., Methods of Artificial Intelligence for Prediction and
Prevention Crisis Situations in Banking Systems, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL NETWORKS, FUZZY
SYSTEMS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 180, 181 (Jerzy Balicki ed., 2014).

148.
See Omohundro, supra note 29, at 483 (arguing that even a chess-playing robot will
be "dangerous unless it is designed very carefully" because "[w]ithout special precautions, it will
resist being turned off, will try to break into other machines and make copies of itself, and will
try to acquire resources without regard for anyone else's safety").
149.
Ortwin Renn & Andreas Klinke, Systemic Risks: A New Challenge for Risk
Management, 5 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. S41, S41 (2004).
150.
van Asselt & Renn, supra note 147, at 436 (discussing and identifying these
characteristics of systemic risk).
151.
See Omohundro, supra note 29 at 483. Seth D. Baum provides an example of a
systemic risk as the fourteenth-century black plague in Venice, which was managed by the
Venetians without knowledge or forethought of germ theory or microbiology. Seth D. Baum, Risk
and Resilience for Unknown, Unquantifiable, Systemic, and Unlikely/CatastrophicThreats, 35
ENV'T SYS. & DECISIONS 229, 231 (2015).
152.
van Asselt & Renn, supra note 147, at 436; see also Tero Karppi & Kate Crawford,
Social Media, FinancialAlgorithms and the Hack Crash, 33 THEORY CULTURE & SOC'Y 73, 74, 77
(2016) (considering the connected nature of human communication and financial system
algorithms and discussing how the eventual coalescence of big data and Al will compound this
interconnectness of social systems). See generally Tomas Hellstram, Systemic Innovation and
Risk: Technology Assessment and the Challenge of Responsible Innovation, 25 TECH. SoC'Y 369
(2003) (providing a full discussion of the systemic risks of networked technology).
153.
See Carlo, Lyytinen & Boland, supra note 145, at 59; van Asselt & Renn, supra note
147, at 436. Note that Baum disagrees that Al (or aliens) could be considered a systemic risk
since, if either risk were to eventuate and achieve world domination, humanity would have lost
control of its system and be rendered incapable of managing it. Baum, supra note 151, at 234.
Thus, any attempts to make systems more resilient to Al or alien invasion is misguided. Id. at
231. Baum's view of the systemic risks of Al is predicated on a vision of the systemic risk being
the singularity or harbinger of doom. The Authors argue that this dismisses the systemic risk
narrower Al systems might present. Notably, Baum suggests that since, in his view, Al is not a
systemic threat, appropriate risk management is "not to increase resilience of affected systems
but to reduce the probability of the systems being affected in the first place." Id. at 234.
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systemic risks are not unknown to public regulators, 154 the potential
size and connectedness of the network that Al can access is
unprecedented. For these reasons, it is unlikely that command and
control models of regulation would be effective to regulate systemic
risk. 155
According to Marjolein van Asselt and Ortwin Renn, systemic
risk should be managed via "a cautious and flexible strategy that
enables learning from restricted errors, new knowledge, and visible
effects, so that adaption, reversal, or adjustment of regulatory
measures is possible." 156 Then the public regulator, business, and
society can ensure that "early warning" systems are in place to detect
risk if it eventuates. 15 7
Public regulators could initially develop
agreed-upon principles that synthesize those things that need to be
considered before formulating the processes necessary to govern those

risks. 158
In the regulation of Al, the mix and interplay of stakeholders
will be important in the formulation of principles to regulate systemic
risk, since it is nonstate stakeholders that are at an information
advantage in understanding the underlying matrix of science and
technology in this area. The necessarily diverse mix of stakeholders
and heterogeneous interests may make unified agreement on
principles difficult. 15 9 Those charged with developing principles will
need to consider not only the technological and scientific concerns but

154.

See Carlo, Lyytinen & Boland, supra note 145, at 59 (discussing management of risk

hazards associated with nuclear facilities). Numerous studies have been conducted considering
the resilience of infrastructure in the face of systemic risk from a number of eventualities. See,
e.g., JONATHON CLARKE ET AL., RESILIENCE EVALUATION AND SOTA SUMMARY REPORT:
REALISING EUROPEAN RESILIENCE FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (2015); Baum, supra note 151;

Seth D. Baum et al., Resilience to Global Food Supply Catastrophes, 35 ENVT SYS. & DECISIONS
301 (2015); Daniel DiMase et al., Systems Engineering Framework for Cyber Physical Security
and Resilience, 35 ENV'T SYS. & DECISIONS 291 (2015); Sabrina Larkin et al., Benchmarking
Agency and OrganizationalPractices in Resilience Decision Making, 35 ENV'T SYS. & DECISIONS
185 (2015); Julie D. Rosati et al., Quantifying Coastal System Resilience for the US Army Corps
of Engineers, 35 ENV'T SYS. & DECISIONS 196 (2015); Nicole R. Sikula et al., Risk Management Is
Not Enough: A Conceptual Model for Resilience and Adaptation-Based Vulnerability
Assessments, 35 ENV'T SYS. & DECISIONS 219 (2015).
155.
Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation, in REGULATORY THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 133, 142 (Peter Drahos ed., 2017).

156.
157.
158.

van Asselt & Renn, supra note 147, at 438.
Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 439 (suggesting communication and inclusion, integration, and reflection as

principles to consider); see ORTWIN RENN, RISK GOVERNANCE: COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN A

COMPLEX WORLD 63 (2008); Bridget Hutter, Risk, Regulation and Management, in RISK IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE 202, 214-15 (Peter Taylor-Gooby & Jens 0. Zinn eds., 2006); see also Carlo,
Lyytinen & Boland, supra note 145, at 59.
159.
Carlo, Lyytinen & Boland, supra note 145, at 70.
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also a range of societal norms and social and economic
considerations. 16 0 Settling on a set of principles will involve an
element of trust in the science and technology. Creating a culture of
iterative and cooperative development could engender this trust.
Progress could be smoothed by a culture of fidelity and transparency
from those with technical knowledge and scientific expertise in Al.
Even if fuller information is available to public regulators, it will still
be difficult to know everything necessary to regulate effectively
because of the opacity of Al algorithms that are not transparent on
their face and are said to reside in an impenetrable black box. 161
C. The Risks of Failingto Regulate Must Be Evaluated Against the
Risks Involved in RegulatingAI
Some academics have proposed that society should merely
adapt existing liability regimes to avoid legal uncertainty and to avoid
the difficulties associated with regulating AL. 162 The common law has
long adjusted to changes in technology iteratively, and, to a large
extent, this incremental approach helps to minimize the risks of
incorrect decisions in regulatory policy. 1 6 3 So, for example, a judicial
process that adapts tort law principles to place liability for harm on
the entity that is most effectively able to mitigate the risk-the "least
cost avoider"-may adequately deal with concerns about potential
harm caused by autonomous cars. Proponents of an iterative, "light
touch" approach favor responding to concrete problems as they arise,
either through incremental adjustments to the common law or careful,
limited, and predominantly sui generis legislation if and as
required.164 The attractiveness of this approach is that it avoids the
necessity of evaluating prospective risks-ensuring that regulation is
targeted and limited to clear harms that courts and legislatures are
160.
Id. at 59.
161.
Crawford has observed that the "algorithmic black box" is compounded by the fact
that "[a]lgorithms do not always behave in predictable ways." Crawford, Can an Algorithm Be
Agonistic?, supra note 86, at 79-80. In an analysis of societal impacts of algorithms, Karppi and
Crawford suggest that, instead of seeking to find transparency in algorithms, a better approach
would be the development of "theories that address and analyze the broader sweep of their
operations and impact[,] as well as their social, political and institutional contexts." See Karppi
& Crawford, supra note 152, at 74.
162.
Chris Holder et al., Robotics and Law: Key Legal and Regulatory Implications of the
Robotics Age (PartI of II), 32 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 383, 386 (2016).
163.
See, e.g., Diana M. Bowman, The Hare and the Tortoise:An Australian Perspective on
Regulating New Technologies and Their Products and Processes, in INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE

MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 8, at 155, 174-75; Kaal, supra note 23, at
15-16.
164.
Bowman, supra note 163, at 157; Kaal, supra note 23, at 16-18.
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able to understand. Those implementing and enforcing the laws could
avoid much of the uncertainty surrounding new regulatory regimes.
The Authors do not subscribe to this light touch method and argue
that AI requires a sui generis approach as outlined in this Article.
Entrepreneurs and technological innovators maintain a
healthy fear of regulation, which is often seen as red tape that hinders
or stymies development. 165 Adam D. Thierer, for example, argues for
what he terms "permissionless innovation"-that "[u]nless a
compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious
harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue
unabated." 166 Ray Kurzweil, too, argues against regulation, preferring
a free-market system to deal with problems if and when they
arise-however, he does this while simultaneously urging caution.16 7
Technology-rich industries have a long history of seeking to avoid the
impulse to regulate that often accompanies widespread social fears
about new technologies. 1 6 8 Scholars and industry representatives
have expressed important concerns about the limits of regulation in
high-technology industries, and AI poses its own specific challenges
for regulators. The key fear is that it may be too early to regulate AI,
and that any regulation adopted today "may hinder developments that
could prove essential for human existence." 169 Risk analysis too
generally involves striking a balance, and the promise of AI may make
taking some risk worthwhile.
However, calls for innovation without any regulation must be
viewed critically. Part II of this Article provided a number of concrete
examples of potential and existing problems and risks that current
applications of as-yet unregulated Al pose for society. The Authors
also argued that there is at least the potential for AI development to
cause harm to humanity and society.
Arguing that regulation
necessarily stymies innovation is a syllogistic fallacy; not all
regulation stymies innovation. There are enough problems already
with relatively narrow Al to persuade regulators that some regulation
may indeed be necessary. While regulation may be difficult and may
meet resistance from the industry, it is important that society begins
to consider the regulation of this vital area. The Authors take up the
challenge of contributing to Al research from a legal and regulatory

165.
Adam Thierer, Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information
Technology PrecautionaryPrinciple, 14 MINN. J.L. ScI. & TECH. 309, 339, 375 (2012).
166.
ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING
COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 1 (rev. & expanded ed. 2016).
167.

KURZWEIL, supra note 25, at 304.

168.
169.

THIERER, supra note 166, at 68-71.
Gurkaynak, Yilmaz & Haksever, supra note 16, at 753.
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perspective in this Article. The next Section details some of the
specific problems that regulators face when attempting to regulate in
this area.
D. The Problems Posed by AI for Regulators
Matthew Scherer sets out four general ex ante problems with
regulating research and development of Al: (1) discreetness, meaning
"Al projects could be developed without the largescale integrated
institutional frameworks"; (2) diffuseness, meaning AI projects could
be carried out by diffuse actors in many locations around the world; (3)
discreteness, meaning projects will make use of discrete components
and technologies "the full potential of which will not be apparent until
the components come together"; and (4) opacity, meaning the
"technologies underlying AI will tend to be opaque to most potential
regulators."1 7 0

These broad categories succinctly capture some of the major
problems facing those seeking to regulate AL. Certainly, AI is being
developed and deployed in many parts of the world, and it is difficult
to predict what problems might arise when even two of these powerful
technologies are combined. However, while there is the potential for
Al development to occur without the need for large scale institutional
frameworks such as government agencies, most of the investment in
research and development is currently being made by large private
companies such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, and Amazon. 17 1
That is where major innovations and developments will be most likely
to occur. This also exacerbates the opacity problem because private
companies are apt to maintain secrecy, are not required to share
information, and are in fact benefitting from the law of patents to
protect their legitimate interests in new technology from other
developers. However, these broad problems represent only the top
layer of concerns; a deeper analysis reveals much more specific and
fundamental problems.
Scherer also proposed a system under which an agency would
be set up to certify AI systems as safe, 172 and where such certified
systems would "enjoy limited tort liability" 173 while uncertified
systems would be subject to full liability. This approach concentrates
on the consequences of problems with Al and seeks to punish errant
behavior after it has occurred. This Article is more concerned with
170.
171.
172.
173.

Scherer, supra note 22, at 359.
See discussion supraPart IV.A.
Scherer, supra note 22, at 394.
Id.
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proposing solutions to regulating the development of AI ex ante. This
Part outlines the potential difficulties associated with this process.
Along with the general problems with regulating new technologies
outlined above, there are a number of specific problems associated
with regulating Al.
1. The Pacing Problem
A particular problem that regulators face is that developments
in technology outpace any attempt at regulating it.174 In the face of
the continuously increasing speed of innovation, legal and ethical
oversight have lagged. 175 This pacing problem plagues the regulation
of technology generally and often leads to the technology disengaging
or decoupling from the regulation that seeks to regulate it. Because
Al is at the forefront of scientific discovery and is developing so
quickly, it is affected by this issue more than other technologies.
Attempts by regulators to address the pacing problem by
future-proofing legislation often result in regulatory disconnect where
the laws are too general or vague to effectively serve their intended
purpose or to provide meaningful guidance regarding any specific
technology.176 Regulators need to find the optimal middle ground
between regulation that is ineffective because it cannot keep pace with
the rate of innovation and regulation that is too general to be
meaningful in specific cases.
2. Information Asymmetry and the Collingridge Dilemma
Private companies are investing heavily in Al research and
development. The result is information asymmetries between those
companies and public regulators seeking to understand those
Even if lawmakers are able to obtain technical
developments.17 7
174.

Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law,

in THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT,
supra note 8, at 19, 19.
175.

ROGER BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION

1-2 (2008); Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Regulation Tomorrow: What
Happens when Technology Is Faster than the Law? 1, 5 (Univ. of Saint Thomas (Minn.) Legal
16-23,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
Paper
No.
Research
Studies,
papers.cfm?abstract.id=2834531; Graeme Laurie, Shawn HE Harmon & Fabiana Arzuaga,
ForesightingFutures: Law, New Technologies and the Challenges of Regulating for Uncertainty, 4
LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 3 (2012); Marchant, supra note 174, at 19.
176.

See BROWNSWORD, supra note 175, at 162; Allenby, supra note 8, at 14-15; Ray

Purdy, Legal and Regulatory Anticipation and 'Beaming' Presence Technologies, 6 LAW
INNOVATION & TECH. 147, 147-48 (2014); Fenwick, Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 175, at 5.
177.
See BROWNSWORD, supra note 175, at 162; Laurie, Harmon & Arzuaga, supra note
175, at 4.
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information from developers, most nontechnical individuals will still
be at a loss to understand a product, let alone predict what impacts it
may have on individuals, societies, and economies.1 78 This is the
major cause of the pacing problem, but it is also an issue for courts
trying to interpret and apply any legislation that has been
implemented, as well as for commentators and advocacy groups
looking to hold companies accountable. It is a special problem for
regulators who need to fully understand the subject of regulation.
This information problem forms the first half of the
Collingridge Dilemma on the control of technology, which states that
at the earliest stages of development of a new technology, regulation is
difficult due to a lack of information, while in the later stages the
technology is so entrenched in our daily lives that there is a resistance
to regulatory change from users, developers, and investors. 179 Al has
already been deployed in society in a wide variety of fields, from
medical diagnostics to criminal sentencing to social media, rendering
the need to address this issue even more urgent. 8 0
3. Little Established Ethical Guidance, Normative Agreement, or
Regulatory Precedent
The ethical and social implications of introducing robots into
mainstream society is a very weighty issue that remains largely
unresolved, even as the consequences of this interaction are already
unfolding.181 Areas in which ethical issues arise include the use of
military robots as well as human-robot relationships, such as the use

178.

See HASAN BAKHSHI, ALAN FREEMAN & JASON POTTS, STATE OF UNCERTAINTY:

INNOVATION POLICY THROUGH EXPERIMENTATION 4 (2011); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information

Acquisition and InstitutionalDesign, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1457 (2011); Gregory N. Mandel,
Regulating Emerging Technologies 9 (Temple Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2009-18,
2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1355674.
179.
DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 19 (1980); Laurie,
Harmon & Arzuaga, supra note 175, at 6.
See ANDREAS MARGELISCH, SwIss LIFE, A STATE OF THE ART REPORT ON LEGAL
180.
KNOWLEDGE-BASED
SYSTEMS
4
(1999),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/

download?doi=10.1.1.49.6315&rep=repl&type=pdf

[https://perma.cc/B2MP-8KXS];

Jason

Borenstein & Yvette Pearson, Companion Robots and the Emotional Development of Children, 5

&

LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 172, 172 (2013); B.M. Dickens & R.J. Cook, Legal and Ethical Issues
in Telemedicine and Robotics, 94 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 73, 73 (2006); Angwin et
al., supra note 89.
181.
Miles Brundage, Limitations and Risks of Machine Ethics, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL
THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 355, 355-72 (2014); Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Baran

QiIriklI, Robots: Ethical by Design, 14 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 61, 61-71 (2012); Perri 6, supra
note 12, at 419-20; Bert-Jaap Koops, The Concepts, Approaches, and Applications of Responsible
Innovation. An Introduction 14 (Tilburg Law Sch., Paper No. 19/2015,
2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2673753.
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of robots as sex partners, caregivers, and servants. 182 Patrick Lin et
al. argue that robot ethics issues can be classified in terms of safety
and errors, law and ethics, and social impact, and they consider the
possibility and desirability of programming ethics into Al systems.1 83
A regulatory regime for the design and deployment of robots and Al in
society must consider the need to include ethics rules in the code that
underpins their operation. That system of ethics must reflect a broad
normative consensus on what ethical values robots and Al systems
should include.
4. Regulatory Delay and Uncertainty
Regulatory delay occurs as regulators consider if and when
they will approve the implementation of a new development. 184 For
example, legislators may preemptively ban the commercialization of
new products in response to public concerns, acting even before
enough research can be conducted to ascertain whether the concerns
are valid or well founded.
This delay causes uncertainty for
developers.18 5 Investors and developers are left in the dark while
legislators decide what to do, sometimes having to withdraw funding
and resources from what might turn out to be a useful and lucrative
innovation because they are no longer able or willing to bear the
risk. 186 This effect adds to the concerns of developers about regulators
seeking to regulate the development of Al.
Of course, some social benefits that may come from innovation
and development of Al may well be lost or limited if regulation is
implemented prematurely.1 87 Cass R. Sunstein, in particular, has
adverted to the problems associated with adopting what is known as
the "precautionary principle" to regulate risk.1 88 People, he argues,
are nothing if not "predictably irrational" 189 and tend to be overly

182.
183.

Lin, Abney & Bekey, supra note 93, at 944-46.
Id. at 945-47.

184.
See BAKHSHI, FREEMAN & POTIS, supra note 178, at 4; Ronald R. Braeutigam, The
Effect of Uncertainty in Regulatory Delay on the Rate of Innovation, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

98, 98 (1979); Stephenson, supra note 178, at 1429-30; Mandel, supranote 178, at 4.
Braeutigam, supra note 184, at 98-99.
185.
186.
Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS
OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86, 87 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012); Mandel, supra note 178,

at 1.
187.
See KURZWEIL, supra note 25, at 264, 289, 409; THIERER, supranote 166, at 120.
188.
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,
1003-04 (2003).
189.

See generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT

SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008) (discussing the term "predictably irrational" and its utility for
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concerned with losses rather than the gains that might be made from,
for example, new technology. 190 He argues that regulators should
therefore avoid regulating purely on the threat of unknown future
risks. 19 1 However, at the same time, he warns against regulatory
inaction "because a probability of harm is, under many circumstances,
a sufficient reason to act." 192 Ultimately, Sunstein urges that "a wide
variety of adverse effects may come from inaction, regulation, and
everything in between," noting the need to "attempt to consider all of
those adverse effects and not simply a subset." 193 This measured
After over sixty years of
approach should find some favor.
developments in Al, regulation now could not be criticized as being
As argued in Part II, as Al
overly reactive or precautionary.
development continues apace, some caution in this area is
warranted.194

5. Coordination Across Regulatory Bodies
Coordinating the many regulatory bodies involved in a new
technology is a problem that plagues every innovating industry.19 5
Many groups and industry bodies have already developed codes of
conduct and standards to regulate the development of AI. 1 9 6 Given the
increasingly interdisciplinary nature of AI research, coordinating
these industry bodies is no less a challenge for public regulators in
this field. 197 An Al regulatory regime would need to account for
regulatory bodies, and
other governmental
existing laws,
self-regulatory industry bodies that develop professional codes of
understanding behavioral economics); DANIEL KAHNEMAN,

THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011)

(noting that intuitive biases often prevent rational decision-making).
Sunstein, supra note 188, at 1009.
190.
191.
See id.
192.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1056.
193.
194.
See supra Part II.D (discussing several issues that may require a regulatory
response, including biases in law enforcement, safety, effects on judicial decision-making,
reduced privacy, and unemployment caused by increasing rates of automation supported by AI).
See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
195.
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2008); Lyria Bennett Moses, Agents of Change: How
the Law 'Copes' with Technological Change, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 763, 767 (2011); Mandel, supra
note 178, at 75; Jason Potts, The National Origins of Global Innovation Policy and the Case for a
World Innovation
Organization
2-3
(Dec.
19,
2015)
(unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2705906.
196.
See, e.g., infra Part IV.B (discussing the codes of conduct produced by the
Partnership on AI and the standards prepared by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE)).
197.
See Moses, supra note 195, at 786-87 (describing regulatory issues associated with
nanotechnology).
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ethics, and it would need to do this across many different fields such
as neuroscience; neurobiology; mechanical, electrical and software
engineering; psychology; innovation studies; and economics and
finance. 198 Soft law developments such as industry codes of practice,
principles, and standards developed by groups of industry participants
vary and can often be at cross-purposes. Gary E. Marchant and
Wendell Wallach propose that this multiplicity of perspectives and
approaches requires an "issue manager" to oversee and coordinate the
various principles, codes, and other approaches.19 9 Marchant and
Wallach have proposed to form a Governance Coordination Committee
to "provide oversight, cultivate public debate, and evaluate the ethical,
legal, social, and economic ramifications

of . . . important new

technologies[.]" 2 00 The current efforts to attempt to govern using these
industry-led soft law approaches are discussed further in Part IV.
6. Agency Capture
Regulatory failure due to agency capture occurs where
regulators become sympathetic towards the industry they are
regulating. This can be the result of any number of factors, such as a
high frequency of interaction between industry and regulators,
industry representatives "buying off' regulators with gifts like free
lunches or sponsorship to attend conferences, or a "revolving door" for
employees between regulatory agencies and industry. 201 While each of
these problems is relatively common throughout innovating
industries, the AI industry is particularly susceptible to the revolving
door issue. 202 The information asymmetry issue where AI companies
hold all the relevant information about the technology makes the
knowledge and expertise acquired by employees of Al developers
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particularly valuable to regulators, which are likely to be interested in
employing former Al developers when (and if) they can.
7. Limited Enforcement Mechanisms and Jurisdiction Shopping
Added to the complexities outlined above, the major players in
the development of Al-such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and
Apple-are some of the biggest, most complex, and powerful
corporations the world has seen. 203 They own and control what Marx
might have described as the means of production in this field-that is,
the vast array of superpowerful computers and the phalanx of the
world's best and brightest mathematicians and engineers required to
churn the algorithms necessary to create AI. 2 0 4 The power disparity
between these players and government regulators, who often struggle
to secure sufficient resources to operate, highlights the difficulties that
might be faced by a regulator in trying to regulate these companies. 205
The fact that the technology is relatively opaque 20 6 also makes
it easier for firms to hide wrongdoing and evade regulation.
Volkswagen, for example, was able to create specific code to identify
the tests used by regulators to measure emissions and make its car
engines appear to run more cleanly than when in normal use. 2 0 7
Similarly, recent reports suggest that Uber created a version of its app
specifically designed to identify users likely to be regulators and
prevent them from accessing the system to investigate concerns or
collect evidence. 208
Part III outlined various risks associated with AI and broadly
grouped applications of Al into three classes based upon the risks that
each pose. The Authors also highlighted the general and specific
difficulties that regulators face when attempting to regulate new
Part IV outlines how public
technologies and, particularly, Al.

203.
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204.
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205.
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further paper on power relations in regulating AL.
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regulators will need to adopt new strategies to begin to regulate Al as
the old strategies lose effectiveness. One strategy will be to regulate
based upon the relative risks associated with particular applications of

AL.
IV. THE NEED FOR REGULATORY INNOVATION
Regulators face an extremely difficult challenge in responding
to Al. As discussed above, regulators find it difficult to keep up with
the pace of change; do not have all the information they require; must
avoid overregulation and uncertainty; require, but cannot rely too
heavily on, specialist knowledge obtained from industry; have to make
do with enforcement mechanisms that are only partially effective; and
need to make clear and justifiable policy decisions in a field that is
highly contested. Traditionally, governments had the information and
resources that put them in the best position to regulate in most
instances.
Society has seen a long period where government held
legislative control of the state. In the field of new technology, at least,
the machinery of control is drifting away from government and is
becoming decentered. This Part reviews this decentering of regulation
and outlines some examples of peer or self-regulation that has begun
to proliferate in the vacuum of government control.
The Authors review both the regulatory theory literature and
the legal literature on the regulation of technology. As will be shown,
these theories have clear limitations when asked to respond to the
development of new technologies but may still provide some guidance
to regulators seeking to approach regulating AL. Regulatory theories
that have developed over the last two decades, such as responsive
regulation and really responsive regulation, are normative and
propose what good regulation should include.
They are also, by
definition, "responsive" and hence presuppose the existence of a
As such, they are best used to guide
regulatory framework.
interactions between regulators and the regulated when regulatory
Further, responsive regulation is
systems are already in place.
limited in its ability to regulate new technologies that exhibit the
kinds of characteristics set out in Part III above-it lacks the
flexibility required to react quickly enough in such a dynamic field.
Further, while much can be learned from regulation of other emerging
technologies, the regulation of Al must be sui generis. While in its
nascent stages, it will require a more nuanced set of regulatory
approaches.
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A. Regulating with Limited Resources in a DecentralizedEnvironment
For a long time, regulation was thought of mainly in terms of
legal commands and sanctions. The state, in the classical model of
regulation, is a powerful entity that can command obedience through
a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. 209 It is now widely
recognized that there are far more techniques in the regulation
toolbox than "command and control" style rules backed by sanctions. 2 10
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite's concept of "responsive regulation,"
for example, sets out a graduated pyramid of interventions by the
state in policing behavior in order to encourage and direct an optimal
mix of regulatory work by private and public entities. 2 11 The
responsive element of "responsive regulation" is that as the regulatory
response moves up the pyramid, "escalating forms of government
intervention will reinforce and help constitute less intrusive and
delegated forms of market regulation." 2 1 2
That is, responsive
regulation still requires government to assert a "willingness to
regulate more intrusively" and by so doing can guide the regulation
where it is most effective, mostly through "less intrusive and less
centralized forms of government intervention." 2 13
Ayres and
Braithwaite proposed a pyramid of enforcement measures by
government with the most intrusive command and control regulation
at the apex and less intrusive measures such as self-regulation at the
base. Government still maintains the ability and responsibility to
ultimately regulate if required. 214 The threat relies on government's
ability to inflict varying degrees of discretionary punishment or other
forms of persuasion within the pyramidal structure if the regulated
entity fails to comply with initial regulatory attempts-this is referred
to as the tit-for-tat approach. 215 The critical effect of responsive
regulation is to highlight developments in alternative means of
regulating other than command and control-and therefore avoid
some of the more problematic effects of blunt regulatory tools. It
appears, however, to be a tool that is still too blunt to hone new
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technologies such as Al. Part of the reason for this is that the
traditional role of government has diminished over time.
1. The Traditional Role of Government in Regulation
When considering the regulatory role of the contemporary state
in 2007, Christopher Hood and Helen Margetts listed four resources of
regulation that governments have in differing degrees in differing
contexts: nodality, authority, treasure, and organization. 2 1 6 Nodality
refers to the government's central position as a receiver and
distributor of information that allows it access to and control of the
full range of information. 217 Governments hold a strategic position
with nearly full information about the area and topic of regulation. 218
Authority refers to the authority of the government to determine what
is legal 219 and to "demand, forbid, guarantee, [and] adjudicate." 220
Treasure refers to the government's assets, both in money and other
tangible assets such as buildings and equipment, which give it the
power to control development at the time and place of its choosing. 22 1
Organization refers to the government's human resources with the
knowledge and skills to be able to carry out any required task. 2 2 2 This
includes arrangements of "[people] (soldiers, workers, bureaucrats),
The
land, buildings, materials, computers and equipment." 223
interaction of these roles traditionally held by government simplifies
analysis of the role of government in regulation. 224 When these
theories are applied to the difficult task of regulating Al, the
challenges that regulators face are clearly visible. In these contexts,
the government's nodality, authority, treasure, and organization have
been depleted or usurped and are not always sufficient to match that
of the major technology companies such as Google, Facebook,
Microsoft, and Apple. Part of the challenge of effectively regulating Al
is to identify opportunities for regulatory agencies to influence other
actors when these four resources are limited.
Similarly, the responsive regulation model depends on a strong
regulatory state that is ultimately able to use sanctions to direct
216.
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behavior. However, as stated, that no longer fully reflects practical
realities. Responsive regulation may still be an effective means of
governing more traditional industries, such as the production of wool
in Australia, 225 but the Authors argue that responsive regulation is
not sufficiently flexible and nuanced to apply to a dynamic
environment such as the development of Al. Further, it relies on the
power of the state to impose the ultimate sanction at the apex of the
pyramid; that is, the command and control regulation of an industry.
The notion of government as the apex of power structures is arguably
no longer applicable, if it truly ever was solely the case. This is
especially so when considering the power, global reach, and diffuse
company structures of companies operating at "Google scale."
2. Decentered Regulation
Over the last three decades, regulatory scholars and regulatory
agencies have been grappling with the "decentering" of regulation,
which recognizes that regulation is not the exclusive work of states
and that the power of the state to command obedience is reduced. 226
As Julia Black contends, a "decentered understanding" of regulation
involves "complexity, fragmentation of knowledge and of the exercise
of power and control, autonomy, interactions and interdependencies,
and the collapse of the public/private distinction." 227 The hallmarks of
"decentered" regulation, she argues, are that it is "hybrid (combining
governmental and non-governmental actors), multi-faceted (using a
number of different strategies simultaneously or sequentially), and
indirect." 228 The current environment surrounding the development of
Al shows that if regulation of Al is to succeed, that regulation must
evolve in an environment that displays these characteristics. Those
regulating in this field need to understand and work within these
parameters. Black argues that decentered regulation
should be indirect, focusing on interactions between the system and its
environment. It should be a process of co-ordinating, steering, influencing, and
balancing interactions between actors/systems, to organise themselves, using such
techniques as proceduralization, collibration, feedback loops, redundancy, and
229
above all, countering variety with a variety.
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Regulators must address the challenges of regulating with
limited resources. These resource constraints have curbed the impact
However, they are particularly
of regulatory bodies in general.
debilitating in the context of new technologies that involve a steep
learning curve and require regulatory bodies to engage deeply in the
industry.
Regulatory agencies that seek to regulate Al in this
environment should first seek to engage with and work with the
relevant actors to learn about and grapple with the complexities in the
field. By doing this, they can begin to understand the motivations of
the relevant players so that they might start to influence the direction
Al development will take. This process, as Black recommends, will
involve recurring loops of discussion and feedback where effective
ideas are fostered and redundant notions are jettisoned. 230 Public
regulators faced with resource constraints must do this while also
managing a shifting regulatory environment where they are subject to
pressure from interest groups and citizens to pursue conflicting
agendas and must also consider how regulation of AI might affect
regulatory work in other fields and industries. Regulators must also
be able to reflect on the effectiveness of their strategies, often in an
information vacuum, and be able to change strategies when one
approach does not work, is ineffective, or even is retrograde. 231
B. Self-Regulation and Peer Regulation
One result of decentered regulation is that governments that
once held a central position of power and influence have ceded some of
that influence and power to a dissipated group of regulatory
participants.
Where political influence and power exist in those
industries, self-regulation evolves and becomes the default position.
In recent years, prominent figures from within the Al industry have
begun to warn about the need to ensure that the development and
deployment of Al technology is effectively regulated. 232 In the absence
of government-led intervention, those within the industry are
regulating themselves. This is not typical self-regulation under the
auspices of a formal government agency but is self-regulation in a
vacuum of government input.
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Some academics have described a kind of self-regulation where
the influence of corporate peers guides the behavior of industry
participants. 2 33 Bob Jessop describes a system of governance that
limits the role of regulatory bodies and emphasizes "the reflexive
self-organization of independent actors involved in complex relations
of reciprocal interdependence, with such self-organization being based
on continuing dialogue and resource-sharing to develop mutually
beneficial joint projects and to manage the contradictions and
dilemmas inevitably involved in such situations." 234 This appears to
describe what is happening in practice in relation to AL. Jessop
emphasizes the role of self-organization of stakeholders to include
(1) the more or less spontaneous, bottom-up development by networks of rules,
values, norms and principles that they then acknowledge and follow; [and] (2)
increased deliberation and participation by civil society groups through
stakeholder democracy, putting external pressure on the state managers and/or
235
other elites involved in governance.

This bottom-up development is happening now in the development of
AL. Prominent industry participants have developed several codes of
conduct and practice, and the next phase of coordinating these
strategies has begun-all outside the auspices of government control.
The challenges of regulating fast-moving technology are so
great that industry self-regulatory approaches are often presented as
the most effective mechanism to manage risk. Industry bodies are
already forming to respond to fears about the ongoing deployment of
Al systems in ways that could be interpreted as staving off what they
might describe as clumsy and heavy-handed public regulation. One of
the most prominent efforts is the Partnership on Al between Google,
DeepMind, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, and IBM, together
with the American Civil Liberties Union and the Association for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). 2 36 The Partnership on
Al's purpose statement is to "benefit people and society," 237 and it is
said to have been "[e]stablished to study and formulate best practices
on Al technologies, to advance the public's understanding of Al, and to
serve as an open platform for discussion and engagement about AI
233.
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and its influences on people and society." 238 It has developed a series
of tenets for the development of Al that commit its members to
ongoing engagement with stakeholders to protect the privacy,
security, and other human rights of individuals. 239 In doing so, the
Partnership is taking on the role of a self-regulatory association and
potentially warding off more enforceable state-imposed regulatory
obligations.
Another industry-led attempt to regulate Al was developed at
the Future of Life Institute's Asilomar conference in January 2017.240
The twenty-three Asilomar principles, as they are known, are grouped
under three headings: research issues, ethics and values, and
longer-term issues. 241 Principles falling within the longer-term issues
include Principle 22, titled "Importance." It states that "[a]dvanced Al
could represent a profound change in the history of life on Earth, and
should be planned for and managed with commensurate care and
resources." 242 Principle 23, titled "Risks," notes that "[r]isks posed by
Al systems, especially catastrophic or existential risks, must be
subject to planning and mitigation efforts commensurate with their
expected impact." 2 43
Further, Principle 24, titled "Recursive
Self-Improvement," notes that "Al systems designed to recursively
self-improve or self-replicate in a manner that could lead to rapidly
increasing quality or quantity must be subject to strict safety and
control measures." 244 These principles reflect concerns that even those
within the industry hold about the development of AGI. The Asilomar
principles contain a similar basket of issues that are reflected in other
industry codes or values statements in relation to AI. 2 4 5 While they
express well-meaning principles of behavior, it is uncertain who will
enforce these control measures and what sanctions may be levied for
their breach.
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Another industry body, the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), recently produced a discussion paper
titled Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing Human
Well-Being with Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems. 246
The Ethically Aligned Design project aimed to "bring together
multiple voices in the Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems
communities to identify and find consensus on timely issues." 247
Those issues address concerns about how to ensure that Al does not
infringe human rights, that the decisions of autonomous systems are
accountable and transparent, and that there are checks in place to
minimize risks through enhanced education. 248
Proponents of Al have sought to counter the fears long
expressed by science fiction authors by highlighting the positive and
benign applications of Al already in place today. 249 Developers
suggest that technical contingency plans like DeepMind's "big red
button" are in place in case AI gets out of hand. 250 The implication is
that up to this limit-the "nuclear option" of shutting down rogue Al
completely-the developers of AI are already effectively regulating its
development through initiatives like the Partnership on AI and the
principles set out by IEEE. In this regard, the Partnership on Al has
endorsed the US government's report Preparing for the Future of
Artificial Intelligence.2 5 1 It is in the interests of industry participants
such as the Partnership on Al not to disavow the government's
position. It shows that the industry is very capable of self-regulating
and that it is in lock-step with the government and its public
regulators. In a classic statement of self-regulation that usurps the
246.
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traditional role of public regulators, the Partnership on Al has stated
that it will continue to pursue "ongoing engagement . . . to bring

stakeholders together, create best practices, share findings and
insights, and to contribute to charting a path forward." 252 Perhaps,
given the government's retreat from regulating in this area, the
Partnership on Al may be best placed to continue this work for the
time being.
It may well be that self-regulation will be effective in
mitigating the most important risks of the development and
deployment of Al systems.
However, there is also a risk that
self-regulation may not be sufficient. 253 First, industry codes or
252.
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principles are not obligatory. The principles or codes are often drafted
broadly as vision or values statements that do not contain any
mandatory requirements but are, rather, guides to practice that may
be ignored. 254 Second, they lack effective enforcement regimes. Even
if they do contain some element of obligation, participants may lack
the will to enforce those obligations. 255
Third, many different
suggested approaches, such as the IEEE standards or the principles
proposed by the Partnership on Al or the Asilomar principles, vary in
their content and focus and lack a central governing body that will
coordinate direction and compliance. 256
Certainly, it will be important to avoid regulation that is
ineffective or unduly stymies research and development. The Authors
suggest that governments need to consider and engage with the
concerns and risks associated with Al now in order to protect public
interests that industry-led regulation is unsuited to addressing. 257
C. The Evolving Nature of Regulation
Despite the efforts of those within the industry to self-regulate,
the task of regulating the development and deployment of AI is
increasingly pressing. The AI Now Report, prepared after the Al Now
public symposium hosted by the White House and New York
University's Information Law Institute in July 2016,258 set out several
key recommendations for future work in Al development. One of
those recommendations was to
[i]ncrease efforts to improve diversity among AI developers and researchers, and
broaden and incorporate the full range of perspectives, contexts, and disciplinary
backgrounds into the development of AI systems. The field of Al should also
support and promote interdisciplinary Al research initiatives that look at AI
systems' impact from multiple perspectives, combining the computational, social
2
scientific, and humanistic. 59

The ongoing pace of change and the notoriously slow response
of lawyers and regulators create real challenges for this type of
multidisciplinary collaboration. So much so that, in a cri de coeur, the
254.

INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG'RS, supra note 245, at 5.

255.

Id. at 18.

256.

See Marchant & Wallach, supra note 199, at 43-44.

257.

See BALDWIN, CAVE & LODGE, supra note 253, at 259-80; Rob Baggott, Regulatory

Reform in Britain:The ChangingFace of Self-Regulation, 67 PuB. ADMIN. 435, 444 (1989); Black,
supra note 20, at 115; Short, supranote 253, at 23.
KATE CRAWFORD ET AL., THE Al Now REPORT:
258.
IMPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGIES

THE SOCIAL AND
IN

THE

ECONOMIC

NEAR-TERM

(2016),

https://artificialintelhgencenow.com/medialdocuments/AlNowSummaryReport_3_RpmwKHu.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9T6-HJJU].
259.
Id. at 5.
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Ethically Aligned Design report noted that "[t]here is much to do for
lawyers in this field that thus far has attracted very few practitioners
and academics despite being an area of pressing need." 2 6 0 The report
calls on lawyers to be. "part of [the] discussions on regulation,
governance, [and] domestic and international legislation in these
areas." 261
Stuart Russell, Daniel Dewey, and Max Tegmark set out two
policy questions they argue need to be addressed by regulators,
academics, and those in the industry: "(1) What is the space of policies
worth studying, and how might they be enacted? (2) Which criteria
should be used to determine the merits of a policy?" 2 6 2 They proposed
that the qualities of these policies should include "verifiability of
compliance, enforceability, ability to reduce risk, ability to avoid
stifling desirable technology development, likelihood of being adopted,
and ability to adapt over time to changing circumstances." 2 6 3 It
appears inevitable that there will eventually be some form of
regulation of Al. The European Union has begun to develop Civil Law
Rules on RobotiCS 2 64 that will ultimately govern the development of

robotics and Al in Europe, which is further discussed in Part V below.
Table 1 below sets out some of the major theories of regulation
that have evolved over the last two decades. Regulatory theory has
developed from the prominent but increasingly less influential
command and control style to more and more nuanced and adaptive
approaches as increasingly complex situations have demanded. As the
Authors suggest, many of these theories are either inappropriate or
would be ineffective when regulating AI.

260.

INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG'RS, supra note 245, at 89.

261.
262.
263.

Id.
Russell, Dewey & Tegmark, supra note 232, at 107.
Id. Other principles of good governance that might be added to this list include that

policies

should be "participatory, consensus oriented, accountable,

transparent, responsive,

effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and [should] follow[ the rule of law." See U.N.
ECON.

&

SOC.

COMM'N

FOR

AsIA

&

THE

PACIFIC,

WHAT

is

GOOD

GOVERNANCE?,

[https://perma.cc/8768-NHCN]
http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf
(last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
See Comm. on Legal Affairs, Rep. with Recommendations to the Comm. on Civil Law
264.
Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. DOC. A8-0005/2017 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter EU Robotics
Report],
http://www.europarl.europa.eulsides/getDoc.do?pubRef--//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+
A8-2017-0005+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN [https://perma.cc/HQ8U-VXVC].
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Table 1-Theories of Regulation
Theory
"Responsive
Regulation" 26 5: a
"tit-for-tat"
approach to
enforce compliance
by persuasion and
education before
escalating up a
"pyramid"of more
punitive sanctions

Guiding principles
Regulators should:
0
0

*

0
R
0
*

"Smart Regulation"

Regulators should:
p
"
*
*
*

"Risk-Based
Regulation"

Think in context;
Listen actively (build commitment with
stakeholders);
Engage with fairness;
Praise those who show commitment;
Signal a preference for support and
education
Signal a range of escalating sanctions that
may be used if necessary;
Engage a wider network of partners as
regulatory responses increase in severity;
Elicit active responsibility from stakeholders
where possible; and
Evaluate regulations and improve
practicesn266

Prefer a mix of regulatory instruments while
avoiding "smorgasboardism";
Prefer less interventionist measures;
Escalate up a pyramid of sanctions when
required (responsive regulation);
Empower third parties to act as surrogate
regulators; and
Maximize opportunities for win-win
outcomes by encouraging businesses to go
"beyond compliance." 26 7

Hampton Review:
*

"Regulators, and the regulatory system as a
whole, should use comprehensive risk
assessment to concentrate resources on the
areas that need them most";

265.
See generally AYRE
E &BRAITHWAITE, supra note 211 (introducing and explaining the
concept of "Responsive Regulation").
266.
Braithwaite, supra note 225, at 476.
267.
NEIL GUNNINCHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, DESIGNING SMART REGULATION 2,
http://www.oecd.org/env/outreach/33947759.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKS5-ZEXT] (last visited Nov.
2, 2017).
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*

"Regulatory Craft"
(focusing on
problem solving)

"Regulators should be accountable for the
efficiency and effectiveness of their
activities, while remaining independent in
the decisions they take";
* "All regulations should be written so that
they are easily understood, easily
implemented, and easily enforced, and all
interested parties should be consulted when
they are being drafted";
* "No inspection should take place without a
reason";
* "Businesses should not have to give
unnecessary information, nor give the same
piece of information twice";
"The few businesses that persistently break
regulations should be identified quickly, and
face proportionate and meaningful
sanctions";
* "Regulators should provide authoritative,
accessible advice easily and cheaply";
* "When new policies are being developed,
explicit consideration should be given to how
they can be enforced using existing systems
and data to minimise the administrative
burden imposed";
" "Regulators should be of the right size and
scope, and no new regulator should be
created where an existing one can do the
work"; and
* "Regulators should recognise that a key
element of their activity will be to allow, or
even encourage, economic progress and only
to intervene when there is a clear case for
protection."26 8
Regulators should:

*
*
*
*

"Nominate potential problems for attention";
"Define the problem precisely";
"Determine how to measure impact";
"Develop solutions or interventions";
"Implement the plan, with ... [p]eriodic

268.
PHILIP HAMPTON, REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS: EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT
7
(2005),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/bud05hampton

150305_640.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BWC-A5T9].
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monitoring, review, and adjustment"; and
"Close project, allowing for long-term
monitoring and maintenance." 269

Regulators should be responsive to:

Regulation"
*
*

*
*
*
*

"Really Responsive

Firms' compliance responses (Responsive
Regulation); but also
The "attitudinal settings" (operating and
cognitive framework of the target of
regulation);
The institutional environment;
The "logics of [different] regulatory tools and
strategies";
The regulatory regime's own performance
and effects; and
Changes in priorities, circumstances, and
objectives. 270

In applying risk-based regulation, regulators should:

Risk-Based
Regulation"

*

*
*

'

*

Be "responsive to regulated firms' behavior,
attitude, and culture; institutional
environments; interactions of controls;
regulatory performance; and change";
"[T]ake attitudinal matters on board";
Identify how attitudes vary across
regulatory tasks; and
"[B]e clear about the degree to which any
particular regulatory task can and should be
guided by a risk-scoring system." 27

Risk-based regulation must focus on:
*
*
*
*

"[Dletectingundesirable or non-compliant
behavior,
[R]espondingto that behavior by developing
tools and strategies,
[Einforcingthose tools and strategies on the
ground, [and]
[A]ssessing their success or failure, and
modifying them accordingly." 272

269.
MALCOLM K. SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 142 (2000).

&

270.
Baldwin & Black, supra note 231, at 61, 73.
271.
Julia Black & Robert Baldwin, Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32 LAW
POL'Y 181, 193, 210 (2010).
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Table 1 outlines a number of theories that describe traditional
methods of regulation. While no one theory would apply as a whole to
the regulation of AI, a risk-based approach in combination with
several of the elements of Really Responsive Regulation and Smart
Regulation may ultimately prove effective. Julia Black and Robert
Baldwin's Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation 273 is perhaps the
closest to this approach. It requires regulators to be "responsive to
regulated firms' behavior, attitude, and culture; institutional
environments; interactions of controls; regulatory performance; and
change." 274 However, Black and Baldwin could not have foreseen the
changes in the Al environment that would occur subsequent to their
article's publication in 2010. The speed of change in the regulatory
environment surrounding AI makes it difficult for regulators to react
in good time. The proliferation of Al into daily life has been fast and
furtive. The consequence is that public regulators will need to be even
more responsive in the forms Black and Baldwin suggest. Perhaps a
Really Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation would be required.
However, the Authors suggest a more nuanced approach is required in
Part V below.
The regulation of AI requires a theory of regulation that is not
bound by the normative straits in which the theories above have
evolved. Those theories detail a normative approach to regulation. 275
They presuppose a regulatory environment already being in place and
the ability of the government to impose its control if ultimately
required to do so. As this Article has argued, this is no longer the
case. However, the main problem that each theory faces when it
comes to new technologies such as Al is that the mechanisms to
respond to change are too slow. They require the machinery of the
state to respond to changes in the regulatory environment, but that
machinery is not easily engaged and, when engaged, responds too
slowly.
Meanwhile, others have offered different and sometimes more
concrete suggestions for how regulatory agencies can deal with the
particular difficulties of regulating fast-moving technological change:

272.
Id. at 187 (emphasis in original).
273.
See generally id.
274.
Id. at 210.
275.
See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 211, at 17; Baldwin & Black, supra note 231,
at 17-18; Black & Baldwin, supra note 271, at 194. See generally NEIL GUNNINGHAM, PETER
GRABOSKY & DARREN SINCLAIR, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Keith

Hawkins ed., 1998).
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Table 2-Applications of Strategies
Guiding principles

Theory
"Adaptive
Policymaking"

Regulation should be:

One Hundred Year
Study on AI

Government should:

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*
*

*

*

White House Report:
Preparing for the
Future of Artificial
Intelligence

Cautious;
Macroscopic;
Incremental;
Experimental;
Contextual;
Flexible;
Provisional;
Accountable; and
Sustainable. 276

Accrue greater technical expertise in AI;
Remove impediments to research on the
social impacts of Al;
Increase public and private funding for
research on the social impacts of Al;
Resist pressure for "more" and "tougher"
regulation that stifles innovation or forces
innovators to leave the jurisdiction;
Encourage a "virtuous cycle" of
accountability, transparency, and
professionalization among Al developers;
and
Continually re-evaluate policies in the
context of research on social impacts. 277

Regulatory agencies should:
*

Recruit and develop technical expertise in

Al;
*

*
*

Develop a workforce with "more diverse
perspectives on the current state of
technological development";
Use risk-assessment to identify regulatory
needs;
Avoid increasing compliance costs or
slowing development or adoption of

276.
277.

Whitt, supra note 21, at 500-04.
STONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 10-11.
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Experimental
Innovation Policy
(OECD Report:
Making Innovation
Work)

443

beneficial innovations where possible; and
Avoid premature regulation that could
stifle innovation and growth. 2 78

The quality and efficiency of public expenditure
on regulation targeted at innovation can be
improved by an experimental approach to
policymaking. Regulators should accordingly:
*

*
*

Embed diagnostic monitoring and
evaluation into regulatory programs at
the outset;
Collaborate closely with private firms and
non-governmental actors; and
Share and compare results of policy
experimentation with other
jurisdictions. 279

Table 2 lists a set of strategies rather than broad theories. They are
In that vein, many
more practically applicable than theoretical.
scholars have suggested specific regulatory tools that may be useful in
regulating new technologies such as AI, which include the following:
* Enhancing flexibility through temporary regulation by using
experimental legislation 2 80 and through sunset clauses to
"define adaptable goals and enable the adjustment of laws and
regulations according to the evolution of circumstances." 28 1
* Creating "regulatory sandboxes" to allow firms to "roll out and
test new ideas . . . without being forced to comply with the
applicable set of rules and regulations." 28 2
* Developing "anticipatory rulemaking" 283 techniques that
leverage feedback processes to enable "rulemakers to adapt to
regulatory contingencies if and when they arise because a

278.

NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supranote 43, at 1-2, 17-18.

OECD & WORLD BANK, MAKING INNOVATION POLICY WORK: LEARNING FROM
279.
EXPERIMENTATION 4 (Mark A. Dutz et al. eds., 2014), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-

Management/oecd/science-and-technology/making-innovation-policy-work9789264185739en#.WeQWXkzMzUo [https://perma.cclDDU5-SWH5].
280.
Fenwick, Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 175, at 24 (recommending to engage in
policy and regulatory experiments by comparing different regulatory regimes and embracing
"contingency, flexibility and an openness to the new").
281.
RANCHORDAS, supra note 23, at 212. See generally Romano, supra note 186
(discussing regulation of financial markets through sunset provisions).
282.
Fenwick, Kaal & Vermeulen, supra note 175, at 25.
283.
Kaal, supra note 23, at 19-20.
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feedback effect provides relevant, timely, decentralized, and
institution-specific information ex-ante." 284
Making increased use of data analysis to identify what, when,
and how to regulate. 285
Utilizing the iterative development of the common law to adapt
rules to new technological contexts where possible, and
developing new specialist regulatory agencies where they are
particularly needed. 286
Using "legal foresighting" to identify and explore possible
future legal developments, in order to discover shared values,
develop shared lexicons, forge a common vision of the future,
and take steps to realize that vision. 287
Creating new multi-stakeholder fora to help overcome
information and uncertainty issues that stifle innovation or
inhibit effective regulation. 288

While there is no shortage of suggested regulatory responses, it
is hard to distil a clear set of concrete recommendations from the wide
and varied literature. This may partly be due to the disparate nature
of Al, including the definitional problems outlined in Part II.
Ultimately, one of the key problems is that while there are common
regulatory challenges across different areas of innovation and
technology policy, there are also highly context-specific challenges. 289
Ensuring regulatory approaches are closely connected with their
contexts requires individual responses to different technologies in
different locations at different times. As Roger Brownsword points
out, this means that inevitably, "the details of the regulatory regime
will always reflect a tension between the need for flexibility (if
regulation is to move with the technology) and the demand for
predictability and consistency (if regulatees are to know where they
stand)." 290 Brownsword concluded that "while we should try to
develop stock (tried and trusted) responses to challenges that we know

284.
Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P. M. Vermeulen, How to Regulate Disruptive
Innovation-From Facts to Data, 57 JURIMETRICS (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 25),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2808044.
Id. at 2; see Jason Potts, Brett Henderson & Gerard Roe, Detecting New Industry
285.
Emergence Using Government Data: A New Analytic Approach to Regional Innovation Policy 3
(Apr.
12,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid=2763978.
286.
Scherer, supra note 22, at 395.
287.
Laurie, Harmon & Arzuaga, supra note 175, at 3.
288.
Mandel, supra note 178, at 1, 4.
289.
Roger Brownsword & Karen Yeung, Regulating Technologies: Tools, Targets and
Thematics, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 14, at 3, 6.
290.
Brownsword, supra note 14, at 27.
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to be generic, simple transplantation of a particular regulatory
response from one technology to another is not always appropriate." 29 1
The spectrum of regulatory approaches from command and
control to self-regulation or peer regulation presents a quandary for
those trying to regulate in this area. There is no quick fix that can be
implemented to resolve the problems which the Authors have
outlined.
The next Part considers some practical and innovative
means to begin the process of regulating the development of Al that
includes considering a number of tools from within self-regulation and
risk regulation theories.
The Authors conclude that while these
theories may eventually influence the regulation of AI, there is
currently a moment in time where all of the stakeholders may be able
to influence the development and regulation of Al through cooperation
and collaboration in the nascent stages of development. In this way,
all stakeholders can have a role and a stake in the way that regulation
develops. This may take the form of overt self-imposed industry codes
of practice or conduct from the participantS 292 and involve less
intrusive and direct guidance from public regulators-what might be
termed a "nudge."
V. STRATEGIES TO REGULATE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Part IV outlined a number of theories of regulation and
detailed some of their deficiencies when it comes to regulating Al. The
Authors also outlined some theories of regulation that may not be
applicable to regulating AL. This Part argues that in the lag time it
takes to properly devise an appropriate regulatory structure to
address AI, public regulatory bodies should begin to exert their
influence on the nascent development of Al so as to broadly guide its
development in beneficial ways. The Authors then suggest that public
regulators should begin to develop risk-based strategies to most
effectively target their limited regulatory resources. Regulating the
risk profile for Al outlined in Part III requires a staggered approach
where the highest risks, as assessed by public regulators, are
addressed first. At the very least, regulators should be taking steps
now to establish what risks pertain to the various classes and types of
Al and should be in a position to regulate if eventually required.
However, as governments have so far shown an inability to engage
with regulation in this area, the Authors suggest that there is a
broader and more immediate role for the state in influencing the
development of Al systems but that doing so well will require some

291.
292.

Brownsword & Yeung, supra note 289, at 6; see Brownsword, supra note 14, at 32.
See discussion supra Part II.
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innovation in regulatory practices. The Authors further suggest that
this can be done immediately while the harder and more onerous task
of preparing risk profiles can happen over a longer term. The recent
Stanford Report recommended a "vigorous and informed debate" to
"steer AI in ways that enrich our lives and our society." 293 How
government regulators may actually be able to steer AI development,
however, is a crucial and, as yet, unanswered question. This Part
considers how public regulatory agencies may be able to adopt
strategies to "nudge"294 the development of Al. In this way, regulators
may be able to influence those responsible for designing and deploying
AI systems to do so in a way that furthers the public interest.
A. The Influence or "Nudging"of Regulators
Much has been made of nudge theory in recent years. 295
Psychological observations as applied in behavioral economics reveal
that normative human behavior can be skewed or distorted by
inherent human biases. 296 Nudge theory proposes that by exploiting
these biases, humans can be nudged to behave so as to achieve an
outcome desired by the nudger. The theory has tended to focus on
nudging individual behaviors. However, recent work has examined
how behavioral economics approaches might influence a broader
spectrum of decision-makers. 2 9 7 In an example used in a study of
environmental policymaking, Elke Weber argued that "decisions could
be reframed in ways that might affect choices [by] changing the focus
of such decisions from individuals to groups." 298 She argued that
"[c]ultures that emphasize the importance of affiliation and social
goals over autonomy and individual goals have been shown to
influence the way in which decisions under risk and uncertainty get
made." 2 9 9 Weber argued further that "[t]he goal of environmental
policy is to change behavior of companies, governing boards and
committees, and members of the general public in the direction of

293.
294.
DECISIONS
libertarian

STONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 49.
See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 5 (2008) (explaining the concept of
paternalism).

295.

See, e.g., id. at 6-8.

296.

See

generally

KAHNEMAN,

supra note

189

(explaining

how

biases

present

themselves).
297.
Saurabh Bhargava & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy
102: Beyond Nudging, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 396, 396-401 (2015); Brigitte C. Madrian, Applying
Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 663, 663-88 (2014).
298.
Elke U. Weber, Doing the Right Thing Willingly: Using the Insights of Behavioral
Decision Research for Better Environmental Decisions, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY 380, 388 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
Id.
299.
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more sustainable, long-term, and socially and environmentally
responsible actions." 300 Weber concluded that "conventional policy
interventions are not using the full range of goals that motivate
behavior and changes in behavior . . . [and] do not utilize the full
range of processes that people use to decide on a course of action." 30 1
These regulatory interventions apply the idea of nudging in its
broadest sense. It is not only the behavior of the individual that can
be the target of behavioral policymaking. The theory can be used to
influence those who govern companies, such as boards of directors. In
this way, regulatory policy can shape the behaviors of companies and,
even more broadly, groups of companies within industries.
In Weber's example, policies are directed to influence the
environmental responsibility of companies. 302 The Authors argue that
similarly broad policies directed at companies developing Al would
begin to influence or guide beneficial behaviors by those companies. If
governments are unable to fully participate yet in gathering
information because of resource constraints or because of the diffuse
nature of AI development, they can begin to shape the behavioral
environment by proposing policy statements that foster the beneficial
and benign development of Al. This approach has several immediate
benefits for public regulators. Foremost, it is relatively inexpensive; it
does not require a great deal of investment to be able to set broad
policy indicators that outline the regulators' attitude to Al
development. It also would buy the regulator time to take on the task
of fully engaging with the regulatory environment as outlined in this
Article.
B. Examples of Influence as Regulation
The approach of the US government in attempting to shape
behaviors of those developing Al is in its infancy.
As an early
indicator, the government has shown that it was, until recently,
prepared to consult with groups of stakeholders. In 2016, the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) conducted a series of public
workshops held at the University of Washington, Stanford University,
Carnegie Mellon University, and New York University. 30 3 The OSTP
also participated in various industry conferences and sought public
comment in the form of a Request for Information. 304 As a further
signal of its policy intention to shape behaviors, the US government
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 391.
Id.
Id.
NATL SCl. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 12.
Id.
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also published two documents: Preparingfor the Future of Artificial
Intelligence,30 5 and The National Artificial Intelligence Research and
Development Strategic Plan.3 0 6 The latter states:
AI presents some risks in several areas, from jobs and the economy to safety,
ethical, and legal questions. Thus, as Al science and technology develop, the
Federal government must also invest in research to better understand what the
implications are for AI for all these realms, and to address these implications by
developing Al systems that align with ethical, legal, and societal goals.307

The Preparingfor the Future of Artificial Intelligence report
made twenty-three recommendations on what government agencies,
schools and universities, and AI professionals could do to prepare for
the future of AI. 3 0 8 The Authors argue that this document on its own
had the effect of engaging with and shaping or influencing the
development of Al. Evidence for the immediate impact that the report
had includes that it was adopted by Partnership on AI. 3 09
These strategies might be seen in a number of different ways.
First, the government is seen to be consultative, and is attempting to
engage with stakeholders in the area. Kenneth Abbott noted that
"modern regulatory policy, including risk regulation policy, views
public communication, input and participation as essential." 310 He
cited the 2012 OECD recommendations on regulatory policy that "call
for 'open government,' including transparency and communication,
stakeholder engagement throughout the regulatory process, and open
and balanced public consultations." 311 Second, it could be seen as an
information-gathering exercise-a necessary first step in the risk
regulation literature as well as in behavioral economics theories.
Third, the government could be seen to be signposting its intention to
regulate if necessary.
The US government, by engaging with Al and those
responsible for developing it and publishing its stated intentions, sent
a clear signal to all those involved in the developing field of AL. It
showed that the government was engaged in the conversations and
was prepared to stake a claim in the game. This also may be seen as
the government seeking to influence or nudge decision makers in the
Al industry and to shape behaviors within that field.
The
government's emphasis on beneficial development clearly articulates
its intentions and focus and sends a clear signal to the entire industry
Id.
305.
306.
NATL ScI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 251, at v.
Id. at 15.
307.
308.
NATL SCl. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 40-42.
309.
Partnership on AI Expresses Support for White House Report on Artificial
Intelligence, supra note 251.
310.
Abbott, supra note 75, at 10.
Id.
311.
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in the United States and, more broadly, in the Western world.
Because many of the companies that develop AI are based in the
United States, such a clear policy signal from the US government
would obviously have an influential effect on the behaviors of the
major AI companies and the people who work within them.
However, in a worrying development, the US government
appears to have retreated from its laudable participation in the
development of Al.
The Preparing for the Future of Artificial
Intelligence report has been removed from the government's website
and archived. 312 Similarly, the government's National Artificial
Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan313 is no longer
available on the White House website and is presumably no longer
government policy. Retreating from its former position sends an
altogether different and equally strong message: that regulation is not
a priority, regulation is not going to happen in the near future, and
the government is, at least for now, uninterested in the development
of AL. Therefore, if Al is to be regulated in any meaningful way in the
absence of government direction, it may well be up to those developing
the AI to control its development. However, this is hardly the ideal
solution. It is unfortunate that the planned policy no longer can have
the influential effect that it once had.
While the US government has retreated from its role as
influencing the development of Al, the European Parliament has
taken positive steps. In February 2017, it passed a resolution to
recommend to the EU Commission (EC) to develop Civil Law Rules on
Robotics (which included Al). 3 14 The resolution recommends that the
European Union adopt rules on liability for issues arising from robots
and AI 3 15 and also recommends that the EC designate a European
Agency for Robotics and Artificial Intelligence to govern robotics and
AL. The Agency would
provide the technical, ethical and regulatory expertise needed to support the
relevant public actors, at both Union and Member State level, in their efforts to
ensure a timely, ethical and well-informed response to the new opportunities and
challenges, in particular those of a cross-border nature, arising from technological
316
developments in robotics, such as in the transport sector.
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The resolution recommends a system of registration of so-called
"smart robots," the definition of which is wide enough to capture Al.
The registration would apply across the European Union. 317 The
resolution also recommends developing a Code of Ethical Conduct for
researchers and designers in robotics and Al to "act responsibly and
with absolute consideration for the need to respect the dignity, privacy
and safety of humans." 318 This move by the European Parliament and
the EC sends a clear signal to the industry intended to influence the
research, development, and design of robots and Al, at least in
Europe.
Once set up, the Agency for Robotics and Artificial
Intelligence will begin to gather the much-needed technical, ethical,
This
and regulatory expertise to begin the regulatory process.
initiative represents the most advanced work towards regulation of AI
today and should be lauded as a model for the rest of the world.
There is therefore a place for government policy to shape the
behavior of those in the Al industry. At the same time, though, more
needs to be done to begin the process of developing regulation. Part IV
proposed that a Really Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulatory
framework will be most effective. The risk-based regulatory approach
will allow regulatory bodies to target their intervention to the most
pressing elements of AI development based upon a risk analysis.
C. Risk-Based Regulation of AI
Parts III and IV outlined a number of risk profiles for various
classes of AL. Given the risks posed by AI, it is appropriate that
regulation responds to those risks. Risk-based frameworks usually
entail the following sequence: first, the regulator sets the level and
type of risks it will tolerate; second, the regulator conducts some form
of risk assessment and assesses the likelihood of the risk eventuating;
third, the regulator will evaluate the risk and rank the regulated
entities on their level of risk-high, medium or low; and fourth, the
regulator will allocate resources according to the level of risk that it
has assessed. 3 19 These tasks are usually carried out by a regulatory
agency after consultation with those within the industry.
In the regulation of Al, then, public regulators must undertake
a risk analysis of current applications of Al. After the regulator has
assessed and set the level of risk that it might tolerate, it must gather
as much information about the state of affairs as possible. This can be
done by consulting with those already in the industry and
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participating in or organizing information sessions such as
roundtables that involve all relevant stakeholders. The risks can only
be properly assessed with all relevant information. Only when public
regulatory agencies or governments are aware of the issues will they
be in a position to properly rank the risks that meet or exceed their
tolerance levels and to allocate the necessary resources to regulate the
risks involved. The Authors' initial triage of risks posed by various
applications of AI in Part III could then be refined and further
developed in a feedback loop after multiple consultation processes.
Van Asselt and Renn emphasized the need for communication
and inclusion when assessing risk. They argued that "various actors
are included, [and] play a key role in framing [the] risk." 32 0 This
inclusion includes "roundtables, open forums, negotiated rule-making
exercises, mediation, or mixed advisory committees, including
scientists and stakeholders." 321 They emphasized that "it is important
to know what the various actors label as risk problems. In that view,
inclusion is a means to an end: integration of all relevant knowledge
and inclusion of all relevant concerns." 322 The participants, they
argue, should include "a range of actors which have complementary
roles and diverging interests." 3 2 3 Bridget Hutter also noted that to
achieve regulatory excellence, "regulators must have access to
accurate information so that they have a clear idea of the risks they
are regulating." 324 As outlined in Part IV, relevant industry parties
are forming industry-level associations and groups to share
information and agree on principles and shared values. As discussed,
this has already resulted in a range of principles and proposed
standards by which many in the industry have agreed to be bound.
However, government and regulatory bodies must now engage in the
process. The US government in particular, up until recently, had
shown that it was willing to take the lead in this information
gathering and sharing phase of the regulatory process. 325
It is
essential for the government to continue this level of involvement if it
is to put itself in a position to be able to regulate effectively. Without
such involvement, it will continue to have little influence on the
direction that Al development takes. At the same time, regulatory
bodies need to begin to assess and rank the various risks associated
with Al applications.
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D. Classifying the Risks
The high costs of, and challenges to, effective regulatory
intervention require that the attention of regulators should be
carefully focused on the areas posing the greatest risk. The Authors
argue in Part III that different claims to Al can be refined into, at the
very least, three broad subcategories based upon whether the AI (a) is
a narrow and single-use Al, (b) displays some characteristics of
operating autonomously or may pursue its own goals, or (c) is or
displays some of the characteristics of AGI. Each of these classes
poses different risks, and those risks vary within classes depending on
Within each category, there are many
the Al application.
subcategories of application. Relatively benign applications of Al such
as in Roomba, Pandora, or simple game applications can be placed
within the low-risk category. On the next level, we include more
robust applications such as the Al in AlphaGo, the more experimental
aspects of AI work carried out by Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple,
Amazon, and any other large player experimenting with Al, as
referred to in Part II above. 326 The third class includes the more
concerning aspects associated with experiments seeking to attain AGI.
This group would include research conducted by mathematicians and
engineers who seek to create either a self-replicating Al or AGI
without concern or knowledge aforethought for its ultimate
capabilities. 3 2 7 The problem with regulating AI identified in Part II is
that each of these applications could plausibly lay claim to being,
applying, or using AL. However, each category does not and cannot
justify or require the same regulatory response, and some applications
may not even require a regulatory response at this stage. 328 It is only
when the risk profile of an Al application increases that a regulatory
For example, more and less risky
response may be required.
applications of Al will exist within a single class of Al (e.g., narrow
AI). However, without a risk analysis, the level of risk of each
application within a class is as yet unascertained.
326.
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The class of AI that poses the greatest risk to humanity as a
systemic risk is AGI. The Authors discuss AGI, even though it does
not currently exist, because it requires an immediate regulatory
response if it is indeed not already too late to regulate its research and
development.
Al professionals are already experimenting with
self-replication and Al autonomy. While these experiments do not yet
reach the level of AGI, they remain a very high potential, and perhaps
imminent, risk. If one of these experiments, through accident or
serendipity, creates a form of AGI, then the concerns expressed by
many in the industry become reality, and the chance to control its
behavior may well be lost. Lethal autonomous weapons also pose an
extremely high risk to human well-being, but this subcategory of Al
application is subject to its own unique regulatory environment and is
outside the scope of this Article. 329
A further complication in regulating Al using a risk-based
strategy arises because none of the risks or classes of AI are static.
The level of risk posed by applications within each class may increase
or decrease. Various push and pull factors will move the applications
in each class up and down depending on features that either
ameliorate or accentuate the risks associated with its use. The risks
posed by narrow applications may become stronger and hence may
ultimately become AGI. The question for regulators is at what point
they should intervene. Should they begin to regulate as soon as AI
poses some risk, or should they wait until an imminent risk is
apparent? A further complication is that, at this stage, relevant
regulators are not even in a position to discern which application of Al
fits within which class. No clear system of classification currently
exists. The Authors' suggestion is to begin classifying based on the
level of risk each application currently poses.
Yet a further complication arises because the same public
regulator or regulatory agency will not regulate all (or even more than
one) of the applications within each class. The identified classes are
separated broadly by risk factors and not by application type. So,
even though they may be in the same class and on the same level of
risk for the purposes of our classification, the regulators who might
respond to concerns raised by the use of AI in autonomous vehicles
will not be required to consider, for example, Google's use of AI to
reduce electricity consumption in its data centers.
The Authors suggest that it is the role of governments and
regulatory bodies to begin to influence the direction that AI is to take
329.
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at a broad level and to attempt to intercede now in its development.
In Parts V.A and V.B, the Authors provided suggestions on the role of
public regulators as to how this might be done. In the meantime, this
Article's initial proposal is for governments or public regulators to
take steps towards regulating AI by obtaining information, joining and
commencing conversations with stakeholders in the industries that
use Al, and influencing the development of Al in ways beneficial to
society. The Authors contend that the most dangerous (and as-yet
unattained) class of Al-AGI-should be regulated now, and serious
questions about its development should be considered and discussed
among AI professionals now.
VI. CONCLUSION

On May 21, 1946, as scientists were still experimenting with
the new power of nuclear energy, Louis Slotin, a Canadian physicist
who had worked on the Manhattan project to develop nuclear weapons
during World War II, was preparing to conduct an experiment in a lab
Slotin was slowly lowering a
in the New Mexico desert. 330
hemispherical beryllium tamper over a piece of plutonium to excite
the neutrons that were emitting from the plutonium core. This
process would create a small nuclear reaction so that the scientists
could measure the results. 331 The process was aptly referred to as
"tickling the dragon's tail." 33 2
Slotin slipped and dropped the
beryllium tamper directly onto the core, causing a momentary but
powerful reaction that irradiated the whole room. Slotin bore the
brunt of the reaction. 333 He died a painful death nine days later from
radiation poisoning. 334
Seventy years later, Al scientists, engineers, and technicians
are experimenting with a new scientific development with potentially
destructive capabilities. If we are to heed the allegory in the golem
stories or the metaphor of the dragon's tail, society must come to the
conclusion that any such danger, no matter its potential, should be
carefully handled. The Authors do not suggest a draconian, command
and control type of regulation, and do not even think it would work.
However, the Authors do suggest a new and more nuanced,
responsive, and adaptive regulation developed to foster innovation and
330.
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to minimize the risks of Al. This approach, as with the approach in
relation to the treatment of nuclear weapons, needs a global solution
and will not be easy.
In the last two decades, the face of technology, the institutions
involved, and therefore the AI regulatory space has changed
dramatically. This period has seen the rise of some of the biggest
technology companies-including Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, and
Google-as major leaders in AL. It is arguable that in terms of new
technology development, including Al, these companies hold the lion's
share of regulatory resources. 335 Public regulators, by contrast,
appear to be increasingly in the difficult position of needing to find
mechanisms to regulate technology they have only limited capabilities
to understand, by influencing firms that are very well-resourced and
connected and that can exercise substantial choice about the
jurisdictions in which they operate.
recent
from
signs
encouraging
are
There
publications-certainly the emphasis on more research into the social
impacts of AI by both the US government and private coalitions is
Still, the rhetoric of avoiding overregulation is
encouraging.
worrying-even the biggest and most well-resourced government
regulators are hesitant and probably will not be particularly well
For smaller
equipped to deal with this issue any time soon.
regulators-including those outside of the United States, there is
almost no chance of successfully intervening in current technological
development. Governments are left to try to influence or nudge the
development of Al at the broad policy level. This remains one of the
only roles that might remain available to government, given the
changing power dynamics between government and these large
companies.
There are benefits to self-regulation, particularly where public
regulators lack the requisite knowledge to understand the problem
that needs regulating. Self-regulation has in its favor that it involves
iterative and cooperative development of standards with input from
various stakeholders at the coalface of the problem. The downside to
self-regulation is that it works best where there is some imminent
threat of state-based penalty for noncompliance.
As discussed,
governments are at a disadvantage, probably for the first time in
history at this scale, against the major corporate stakeholders in Al.
The US government is perhaps best able to shape the
development of Al because many of the major AI companies are based
in the United States. Recent studies in behavioral policymaking
335.
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suggest that the attitudinal settings of people within groups shape the
development of the group. The government recently set about the task
of informing itself about Al, and it has set out both a strategic and a
research and development policy that seeks to influence beneficial
By setting out its agenda as it has and by
development of AI.
investing in collaboration with industry participants, the US
government had set a positive benchmark that sought to sway
participants in the field. Whether this can be called nudging or not is
moot, but the intention was clear. However, the government has more
recently retreated from this stance; this is regrettable. The latest
retrograde steps send an equal and opposite message to AI developers.
In a positive sign, though, the European Union has taken proactive
steps toward regulation of robots and Al, and other countries might do
well to replicate its example.
Because regulators do not yet have the expertise or even
enough information to create expertise, if we are ever to ensure Al is
developed in a way that is beneficial for humanity, developers must
acknowledge both their social obligation to share information (be
transparent and accountable) with others, and the critical importance
of collaborations with thinkers from other disciplines. The ethics
board set up by DeepMind and Google, and the Partnership on Al, are
great examples of this. However, the problems that face potential
regulators attempting to regulate such a dynamic field illustrate that
more collaboration and information sharing between all relevant
parties is required if society is to safely reap the benefits of Al.
The risks that different classes of AI pose lie along a spectrum.
Similarly, the different applications of Al pose different and variable
risks within the field in which they are applied. Public regulators
must begin to engage with researchers and professionals in the area to
gain the necessary information required to be able to identify and
regulate in relation to the greatest risks that Al poses. By adopting a
risk-based approach, public regulators will be able to target their
approaches to achieve the most efficient and effective regulatory
outcomes.

